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STATEM1;:'.NT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of The c~rne. 
This case arises from the administrative bid process of the Idaho Department of 
Administration's ("IDA") implementation of the Idaho Education Network. See Idaho Code 
§ 67-5745(D). At the end of the day, after completion of the administrative bid process, 
including IDA's Request for Proposals, the Responses to the RFP, the Notice of Award, IDA's 
issuance of the Statewide Blanket Purchase Orders ("SBPOs") to Qwest Communications 
Company, LLC, ("Qwest") and to ENA Services, LLC, a division of Education Networks of 
America, Inc. ("ENA"), and the defined scope of services to be purchased from Qv1est and ENA 
as provided in an amendment to the two SBPOs, Syringa Networks, LLC ("Syringa") sat as a 
disappointed subcontractor because its expectation of work was no longer there. Syringa' s 
reaction was to file a direct civil action against IDA for (1) breach of contract, (2) declaratory 
relief for alleged violation of Idaho Code § 67-5726, and (3) declaratory relief for alleged 
violation ofidaho Code § 67-571 S(A), and a claim of tortious interference with contract against 
IDA, the Administrator J. Michael Gwartney ("Gwaiiney"), and the Chief Information Ofiicer 
Jack G. Zickau ("Zickau"). Additionally, Syringa included causes of action for tortious 
interference with contract and with prospective economic advantage against Qwest, and fu1iher 
alleged that ENA had breached a Teaming Agreement. R., pp. 27-29 (Verified Complaint). 
B. Course Of Proceedings Below. 
IDA, Gwartney and Zickau (collectively, the "State Defendants") moved for summary 
judgment on the claims for breach of contract, and declaratory relief (I.C. § 67-5726/I.C. § 67-
571 S(A)) on the alternative grounds that Syringa lacked standing to sue IDA and/or that its 
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claims were barred due to Syringa's failure to exhaust aclministralive remedies. IDA, Gwartney 
and Zickau moved to dismiss the tortious interference with contract claim because it was barred 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-904(3). On July 23, 2010, the District Court granted summary 
judgment on the breach of contract and declaratory relief claims due to Syringa' s failure to 
exhaust administrative remedies, R., pp. 1153-1157 (Substitute Memorandum Decision and 
Order). Pursuant to stipulation, the parties agreed to complete fact discovery prior to the District 
Court's hearing the motion for summary judgment on Count 4 (Tortious Interference with 
Contract). 
Syringa filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court's July 23, 20 I 0 Substitute 
Memorandum Decision and Order on the dismissal of Counts 2 and 3 of the complaint. Syringa 
argued that there was no administrative remedy to exhaust associated with the amended SBPOs. 
R., p. 1657 (Memorandum Decision Re: Motion to Reconsider). The District Court rejected 
Syringa's argument because it does not read LC.§ 67-5733 so narrowly. Id. at 1658-59. The 
District Court held that, "Syringa did not exhaust its administrative remedies in challenging these 
awards and cannot now resort to the Court to challenge the awards. See, e.g., Lochsa Falls, LLC 
v. State, 147 Idaho 232, 207 P.3d 963 (2009)." R., p. 1659. Accordingly, the District Court 
denied the motion for reconsideration. Id. at 1660. 
On February 9, 2011, the District Court granted the State Defendants' motion for 
summary judgment on Count 4 of the complaint on the following grounds: (I) IDA is immune 
from liability on the tortious interference claim under LC. § 6-904; (2) Syringa failed to 
overcome the presumption that Zickau acted within the course and scope of his employment, 
without malice and without criminal intent; and (3) Syringa failed to overcome the presumption 
that Gwartney acted within the course and scope of his employment, without malice and without 
- 2 -
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criminal intent. R., pp. 2582, 2585 and 2587 (Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motions 
for Summary Judgment). Syringa now appeals the District Court's dismissal of Counts 2, 3 
and 4 of the complaint. 
C. Counterstatement 
In 2008, the Idaho State Legislature authorized the creation of a "statewide coordinated 
and funded high-band width Education Network" called the Idaho Education Network ("IEN"). 
2008 Idaho Sess. Laws, Ch. 260 § 3 (codified at I.C. § 67-5745(D)). The IEN was meant to be 
"The coordinated, statewide telecommunications distribution system for distance learning for 
each public school." I.C. § 67-5745(D)(2). The legislation assigned IDA the oversight 
responsibility for development and implementation of the IEN. 2008 Idaho Sess. Laws, 
Ch. 260 § 3. IDA was to "[p ]rocure telecommunication services and equipment for the IEN 
through an open and competitive bidding process." Id. 
In December of 2008, IDA issued the lEN Request for Proposals 02160 ("RFP"), seeking 
bids for the initial phase of the IEN project. R., disc 12, Affidavit of Mark Little, Exh. A (IEN 
RFP 02160 dated 12/15/2008). The RFP provided that "[s]trong consideration will be given to 
proposals that incorporate partnerships between multiple providers." Id. at p. 22 (RFP 
at§ 3.3(b)). The RFP also specified that "[a]ny resulting contract from this solicitation will be 
awarded up to four providers." Id. at p. 31 (RFP at § 5.3). In Amendment 4 of the RFP dated 
January 6, 2009, the language was changed to "any resulting contract from this solicitation may 
be awarded up to four providers." R., disc 12, Affidavit of Mark Little, Exh. E (IEN RFP 02160 
Amendment 4 dated 1/6/2009 at p. 5) (emphasis added). 
The RFP contained the following limitation: "Bidders must also have a service provider 
identification number from the Universal Service Administrative Company and be eligible to 
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participate in the Universal Service Fund Program for Telecommunication Services 
provided to the E-Rate Eligible Entities." Id., Exh. A, p. 21 (RFP at § 3.2). Only E-Rate 
services providers could bid on the RFP. Id.; R., p. 2557.J 
The RFP provided that "the state reserves the right to reject any or all proposals, wholly 
or in part, or to award to multiple bidders in whole or in part. All awards will be made in a 
manner deemed in the best interest of the State." R., disc 12, Aff. M. Little, Exh. A, p. 14 (RFP 
at § 2 "Award"). The RFP contemplated that the different schools across the state would have 
different needs of connectivity services and provided that: "The state shall not be required to 
purchase any specific service or minimum quantities of network services. The quantities 
provided in this RFP as examples are for the sok purpose of assisting the Bidders in preparation 
of their proposals and for the State to evaluate the feasibility of the proposed network solutions. 
" Id., Exh. A, p. 47 (RFP at§ 10) (emphasis added). 
Syringa and ENA entered into a "Teaming Agreement" for the purpose of jointly 
responding to the RFP. R., pp. 1858-1860. The "Teaming Agreement" provided in relevant 
part: 
2. TEAMING 
a. Purpose. ENA is seeking to become either (i) the 
Prime Contractor for the Project or (ii) the prime contractor for the 
po1iion of the Project which provides all services to schools and 
libraries. If ENA or Syringa are awarded the Prime Contract, ENA 
and Syringa shall enter into an agreement pursuant to which 
Syringa shall provide connectivity services statewide to ENA. The 
purpose of this agreement is to define the parties' respective rights 
and obligations in connection with the Proposal, the Project, and 
the Prime Contract. 
l E-Rate status refers to telecommunication and internet access companies that are qualified to 
receive funding under the Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996. 
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b. Relatiouship. The 2;s 
ENA will be the prime contractor for either (i) the Project or (ii) 
the prime contractor for the portion of the ect which provides 
all services to schools and libraries, and, if ENA wins the Prime 
Contract, Syringa will provide connectivity services in connection 
with the Project. The will contractors with 
respect to this agreement and the Project 
h. Termination. This agreement will terminate without 
liability upon any of the following events: 
i. The customer formerly and finally rejects lhe 
Proposal or cancels the Project; ... 
iii. Service Agreement. 
(a) Generally. If ENi\ \Vins the Prime Contract 
as provided in Section 2(a) above, the parties shall execute a 
Partnership Agreement as specified in lhis agreement that will also 
include any required flow-down provisions or other appropriate 
terms similar to those set forth in the Prime Contract. 
(b) ENA Responsibilities. If ENA wms the 
Project as provided in Section 2(a) above, in connection with 
performing the Prime Contract, ENA shall be responsible for the 
following functions for all participating schools and libraries: 
(i) procuring and owning all customer premises equipment, 
(ii) coordinating field service, (iii) managing the customer 
relationship, (iv) serving as the fiscal and contracting agent, 
including responsibilily for invo1cmg and collections, 
(v) management of E-Rate Funds and (vi) procuring, managing and 
provisioning last mile circuits. 
(c) Syringa Responsibilities. If ENA wins the 
Project as provided in Section 2(a) above, in connection with 
performing the Prime Contract, Syringa shall be responsible for 
(i) providing the statewide backbone for the services, (ii) providing 
and operating a network operation center for lhe backbone, 
(iii) providing for co-location of core network equipment, 
(iv) procuring and owning all customer premises not provided by 
ENA, ( v) coordinating field service for non-school or library sites, 
(vi) managing the customer relationship for non-school or library 
sites, and (vii) procuring, managing, and provisioning last mile 
circuits for non-school or library sites. 
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Id. Under the Teaming Agreement, Syringa intended 011 becoming ENA's subcontractor to 
provide the connectivity services required by the IEN if ENA was awarded the whole contract 
and IDA purchased such services from ENA. 
On January 12, 2009, Syringa and ENA jointly responded to the RFP by submitting a 
proposal printed on stationary that displayed logos for both Syringa and ENA at the top of each 
page, and they called themselves the "IEN Alliance." R., p. 163. The cover letter to the IEN 
Alliance Proposal states: "The IEN Alliance founding members, ENA and Syringa will lead the 
partnership. For the purpose of executing a contract, ENA will be the contracting entity for the 
Project with Syringa as the principal pminer and prime supplier." Id. at 169. The IEN Alliance 
Proposal identified ENA and ENA, Inc. as the service providers who were registered with the 
USAC. Id. at 269. The RFP required a bidder to submit a signed signature page on an IDA 
supplied form. The signature page for the IEN Alliance bid proposal was signed by David M. 
Pierce, President and CEO of ENA. Id. at 467. The signature page identified the bidder/offeror 
as "Education Networks of America, Inc./ENA Services, LLC." Id. 
IDA also received responsive proposals from Qwest and Verizon Business Network 
Services, Inc. Id. at 581 (January 20, 2009 Letter of Intent to Award). On January 20, 2009, 
IDA issued a letter of intent to award to "Qwest Communications, LLC and Education Netvmrks 
of America, Inc./ENA Services, LLC for being awarded the most points." Id. 
On January 28, 2009, IDA issued a Statewide Blanket Purchase Order to Qwest 
(SBPO 1308) and a Statewide Blanket Purchase Order to ENA (SBPO 1309). Id. at 582 
and 584. 
On February 26, 2009, IDA issued Amendment 1 to SBPO 1308 and Amendment 1 to 
SBPO 1309. Id. at 588-593. Each Amendment stated: "It is the intent of the State of Idaho to 
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amend SBPO 1308 [SBPO 1309] to clarify the rules and responsibilities of the parties to the 
agreement." Id. at 588 and 592. Each amendment also stated: "The State considers Qwest and 
ENA equal partners in the IEN Project as demonstrated in the Intent to Award Letter dated 
January 20, 2009 and the subsequent SBPO 1308 [SBPO 1309] dated January 28, 2009." Id. 
at 589 and 593. The Amendments clarify the scope of work for both Qwest and ENA, such that 
Qwest would be the general contractor in coordination with ENA, for all IEN technical network 
services, and ENA will be the Service Provider listed on the State's federal E-Rate Form 471 and 
will coordinate delivery of all IEN network services and suppo1i. Id. at 588 and 592. The effect 
of Amendment 1 to SBPO 1308 and to SBPO 1309 was to assign to Qwest the "entire scope of 
work assigned to Syringa in the Teaming Agreement and the IEN Alliance Proposal." Id. at 
1144. 
Prior to filing its Complaint, Syringa did not seek any form of administrative relief from 
the IEN RFP specifications, the awards to ENA and Qwest, or to the amended awards. Id. 
II. 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether an alternative ground exists to affirm the District Court's summary 
judgment on Counts 2 and 3 of the Complaint, i.e., Syringa lacked standing to sue IDA. 
2. Whether the State Respondents are entitled to attorneys' fees and costs on appeal 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117 (1 ), § 12-120(3 ), and § 12-121, Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54, and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41. 
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A. Standard Of Review. 
The standard of review by the Idaho Supreme Comi of an order from the District Court 
granting summary judgment is de nova. When this Court "reviews a District Court's grant of 
summary judgment, it uses the same standard properly employed by the District Court originally 
mling on the motion." Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, Inc., 134 Idaho 84, 87, 996 
P.2d 303, 306 (2000). Under that standard, smnmary judgment "shall be rendered fmihwith if 
the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). The moving party has the burden of establishing 
the lack of a genuine issue of material fact. Orthman v. Idaho Power Co., 130 Idaho 597, 600, 
944 P.2d 1360, 1363 (1997). To meet this burden, the moving party must challenge in its motion 
and establish through evidence that no issue of material fact exists for an element of the 
nonmoving party's case. Smith v. _,'1feridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2, 128 Idaho 714, 719, 918 P.2d 
583, 588 (1996). 
The nonmoving party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's 
pleadings, but the paiiy' s response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set 
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Venters v. Sorrento 
Delaware, Inc., 141 Idaho 245, 250, 208 P.3d 392, 397 (2005). A "mere scintilla of evidence" 
that creates only "slight doubt as to the facts" is not enough to avoid summary judgment. NW 
Bee-Corp v. Homeliving Serv., 136 Idaho 835, 839 41 P.3d 263, 267 (2002). Moreover, while 
the moving party generally bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of material facts, a 
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failure of proof on an essential clement of the opposing party's case makes all other facts 
immaterial. Bade!! v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 765 P.2d 126, 127 (1988). 
B. This Court 
Counts 2 And 3 
Standing To Sue 
Of Smmnary Judgment On 
Ground Syring.a Lacked 
In deciding IDA' s Mo Lion for Summary Judgment on Counts 1 (Breach of Contract), 2 
(Declaratory Relief J.C. § 67-5726), and 3 (Declaratory Relief LC. § 67-5718(A)), the District 
Comi concluded that Syringa had standing to pursue its claims for declaratory relief Id. at 
1153.2 IDA submits that the District Court's conclusion was in error. Standing is jurisdictional 
and can be raised as a basis to dismiss the action at any time. Beach Lateral Water Users Ass 'n 
v. Harrison, 142 Idaho 600, 603, 130 P.3d 1138, 1141 (2006). 
This Court exercises "free review over questions ofjurisdiction, and such questions must 
be addressed prior to reaching the merits of an appeal." Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705, 709 
(2009). "It is a fundamental tenet of American jurisprudence that a person wishing to invoke a 
court's jurisdiction must have standing." Young v. City a/Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104-105, 44 
P.3d 1157, 1159-60 (2002). "Standing is a preliminary question to be determined by this Court 
before reaching the merits of the case." Id.l 
2 
3 
Count 1 of Syringa's Complaint brought a breach of contract claim against IDA, even though 
Syringa was never party to any contract with IDA. R. at pp. 5 - 12 (Count One). Syringa has 
not appealed the dismissal of its breach of contract claim against IDA 
The Court may affirm the District Court's decision if an alternative basis to support such a 
decision exists. See Thomas v. Thomas, 150 Idaho 636, 644 (2011 ). Standing is both an 
issue on cross-appeal and an alternative basis for affirming the District Comi's decision. 
Either way, given that standing is a jurisdictional issue, it must be addressed before the 
merits of the case. Young, 137 Idaho at 104-105. 
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The doctrine of standing is a subcategory ofjusticiability. Id "Standing focuses on the 
party seeking relief and not on the issues the party wishes to have adjudicated." Id "To satisfy 
the case or controversy requirement of standing, a litigant must allege or demonstrate an injury in 
fact and a substantial likelihood the relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury." 
id "This requires a showing of a distinct palpable injury and fairly traceable causal connection 
between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct." Id 
Syringa's Second and Third causes of action seek a declaratory judgment that the 
amended SBPOs did not comply with Idaho Code§§ 67-5718(A) and 67-5726 and should be 
voided. The Declaratory Judgment Act provides authority for the courts to render declaratory 
judgments, but it does not ''relieve a party from showing that it has standing to bring the action in 
the first instance." Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho 767, 772, P.3d 1232, 1237 (2006). 
1. Disappointed Bidders do Not Have Standing to Challenge an Award Absent 
Legislation Authorizing the Challenge. 
In Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., the United States Supreme Court held that a disappointed 
bidder for a federal government contract does not have standing to sue the govermnent for 
violations of bidding rules contained in the Federal Public Contracts Act. Perkins v. Lukens 
Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 125-26 (1940). In affirming the view that "bidders have no standing in 
the courts," the Court focused on the absence of legislation authorizing disappointed bidders to 
challenge the award of government contracts. Id. (explaining that "neither the damage nor loss 
of income in consequence of the action of the Government, which is not an invasion of a legally 
recognized right, is itself a source of the legal rights in the absence of constitutional legislation 
f_9fognizing it as such.") ("emphasis added). The Court further explained that "Conrts should 
not, where Congress has not done so, subj cet purchasing agencies of Govermnent to the delays 
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necessarily incident to judicial scrutiny at the instance of potential sellers .... " Id at 130 
(emphasis added). 
Subsequent to Perkins, federal and state governments have passed legislation allowing 
disappointed bidders to challenge the award of government contracts under limited 
circumstances. For example, "The Tucker Act, as amended by the Administrative Dispute 
Resolution Act (ADRA), gives [the Federal Court of Claims] jurisdiction in bid protest actions 
and confers standing on an 'interested party' objecting to a proposed contract or to a proposed 
award or award of a contract." Eagle Design & Mgmf v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 106, 108-
109 (Fed. Cl. 2004) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(l)). The term "interested party" is defined as an 
"actual or prospective bidder or offeror whose direct economic interest would be affected by the 
award of the contract or failure to award the contract." Id. Given that the legislation only 
authorizes an "actual or prospective bidder" to protest the award of a government contract, a 
subcontractor lacks standing to bring such a challenge. Id. at 106 ("Because Eagle Design was a 
subcontractor to an offeror in this procurement and was not itself an actual or prospective 
offeror, it is not an interested party within the meaning of this Court's authorizing legislation as 
construed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. As such, Eagle Design 
lacks standing to bring this post-mvard bid protest."); see also Pure Power!, Inc. v. United States, 
70 Fed. Cl. 739, 745 (Fed. Cl. 2006) ("Because plaintiff is 'properly characterized as, at best, a 
prospective supplier or subcontractor to Mack Trucks, rather than an actual or prospective bidder 
on a government solicitation, plaintiff cannot qualify as an interested party with standing."). 
State and federal courts throughout the country have held that subcontractors or other 
non-bidders lack standing, especially where the subcontractor cannot point to legislation that 
authorizes a subcontractor to challenge the award of a government contract. See, e.g., Fort 
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Howard Co. v. Department of !vfanagernent Servs., 624 So. 2d 783, 784 (Fla. App. 1993) 
(holding that a subcontractor Jacks standing to challenge the award of a govenunent contract 
because a subcontractor does not fit within the Florida legislation authorizing such challenges); 
Treadon v. City of Oxford, 149 Ohio App. 3d 713, ?14-715 (Ohio Ct. App., 2002) (subcontractor 
has no standing because "[ w]ithout submitting a bid, appellant has no standing to challenge the 
award of a contract on a public construction project"); Percy J Afatherne Contr. v. Grinnell Fire 
Protection Sys. Co., 915 F. Supp. 818, 823 (E.D. La. 1995) (subcontractor has no standing 
because he could not point to "authority [under the Public Bid Law] permitting a subcontractor 
in the posture of this plaintiff to challenge the validity of the prime contract"). 
2. The Idaho Code Allows Challenges to ID.A Contract Awards Only Under 
Limited Circumstances. 
The Idaho Code sets forth a comprehensive statutory framework regulating contracts with 
the IDA division of purchasing. 5'ee Idaho Code§ 67-5714, et. seq. The Idaho Code sets forth 
rules regarding IDA contracts and creates a mechanism for challenging awards of IDA contracts. 
Specifically, Idaho Code § 67-5733 authorizes challenges only under specified and limited 
circumstances. For example, Idaho Code§ 67-5733(1)(a) authorizes a vendor to challenge 
specifications, but only if that challenge is made within ten working days after receipt of notice. 
Idaho Code§ 67-5733(l)(c) provides that a "vendor whose bid is considered" may challenge the 
award of an IDA contract "within five (5) working days following receipt of notice that he is not 
the lowest responsible bidder." Syringa readily acknowledges these statutory provisions govern 
challenges to IDA contract awards. See Syringa's Brief~ p. 32 ("Syringa acknowledges that the 
administrative appeal requirements ofldaho Code § 67-5733 apply to bid specification 
challenges and to award challenges."). 
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Without Idaho § 67-5733 or other lcgi:;Jation, neither bidders nor other 
interested parties would have any right to challenge an IDA contract award. Idaho Code§ 67-
5733 creates such a right only with regard to certain parties and only upon compliance with 
specific timing requirements. In other words, the statute creates a two-part test for determining 
whether an individual or entity can challenge an IDA contract award: (I) Does the statute 
authorize the challenge?; and (2) Did the challenger comply with the timing requirements for 
bringing its challenge? 
3. Syringa Lacks to Challenge the Amended SHPO's Because 'Was 
Merely a Potential Subcontractor and No Statute Authorizes 
Challenge 
The IEN RFP contained the following limitation: "Bidders must also have a service 
provider identification number from the Universal Service Fund discount program for 
telecommunications services provided to the E-Rate eligible entities." R., Aff. of Mark Little, 
disc 12, Exh. A (IEN RFP at§ 3.2). To receive E-Rate funding through the Universal Service 
Administrative Company ("USAC"), a service provider must be registered with USAC. Syringa 
was not so registered and was not eligible to participate in E-Rate funding. R., p. 269; R., p. 
1141 (Substitute Memorandum Decision and Order at 3). Accordingly, it was not eligible to bid. 
The cover letter to the IEN Alliance Proposal made clear that Syringa was not the bidder by 
providing as follows: "For the purpose of executing a contract, ENA will be the contracting 
entity for the project with Syringa as the principal partner and prime supplier." R., p. 169. The 
IEN RFP required a bidder to submit a signed signature page on an IDA supplied form. The 
signature page for the IEN Alliance bid proposal was signed by David M. Pierce, President and 
CEO of ENA, and was not signed by Syringa. R., p. 467 The signature page identifies the 
bidder/offeror as "Education Networks of America, lnc./ENA Services, LLC." Id. 
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Syringa readily acknowledges that it was not is considered. See 
Syringa's Brief, p. 32. Instead, Syringa admits that it was a "subcontractor[] who did not submit 
a bid." Id. This admission is fatal to Syringa' s standing. As explained above, Jdaho Code § 67-
5733 authorizes challenges only by specified parties under limited circumstances, including (l) 
specification challenges by vendors and (2) award challenges by a "vendor whose bid is 
considered." Syringa contends that it was neither. See Syringa's Brief, p. 34 (asserting that 
"Idaho Code § 5733 ( c) ... does not apply to Syringa because Syringa was not 'a vendor whose 
bid is considered."'); see also Syringa's Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 20 
("Syringa's claims do not involve a bid protest brought by a disappointed bidder or a challenge 
to the specifications of the RFP"). Moreover, the IDA never treated Syringa as a bidder. 
If Syringa is not challenging the SBPO under Idaho Code § 67-5733, it must point to 
some other authority that grants it standing to bring its challenge. See Shook Heavy & Envtl. 
Constr. Group v. City of Kokomo, 632 N.E.2d 355 (Ind. 1994) (explaining that, where the 
Indiana Public Purchasing Statute provides for challenges to contract awards only under two 
circumstances, a disappointed bidder who does not fit within one of those two circumstances 
lacks standing to challenge the award because the "legislature has not provided any statutory 
basis" for such a challenge). Syringa has not and cannot point to any such authority. 
Accordingly, Syringa has no standing to bring its Declaratory Judgment Act claims against IDA. 
Finally, it should be noted that Syringa argued before the District Court that the Teaming 
Agreement between Syringa and ENA gave Syringa standing to challenge the SBPO. Even if 
enforceable, the Teaming Agreement would do no more than make Syringa a subcontractor. As 
explained above, a subcontractor has no standing to challenge the award of an IDA contract. In 
any event, as the District Comi correctly concluded, the Teaming Agreement is unenforceable. 
14 -
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R., pp. 2593 - 2596. Syringa cannot show that it has an injury fact and a substantial 
likelihood that relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury. 
Syringa asserts at 45 of its brief that "ENA had the right and ability to say 'no' to 
the amended SBPO offered to if' and that could and should have asserted that DOA could 
not do so under Idaho Code § 67-5718(A)." The fact that ENA may have had sta11ding to 
challenge the SBPO does not mean that Syringa, as a subcontractor, has standing. See Fort 
Howard Co. v. Dept. o[Managernent Servs., 624 So. 2d 783, 785 (Fla. App. 1993) (explaining 
that a subcontractor has no standing to challenge the award of a government contract, especially 
where the potential prime contractor who submitted the bid did not challenge the award). 
In summary, Syringa lacks standing to challenge the SBPO. Accordingly, Syringa's 
Second and Third causes of action should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 
C. The District Court Correctly Dismissed Counts 2 And 3 Of The Complaint For 
Failure To Exhaust Administrative Remedies. 
Syringa is caught in a catch-22. Syringa must first establish that it has standing to 
challenge the awards. To have such standing, Syringa must show that Idaho Code § 67-
5733(l)(c) authorizes its challenge, which requires a showing that Syringa was a "vendor whose 
bid is considered." Syringa, however, disclaims the applicability ofl.C. § 67-5733(l)(c). This 
statute requires that a challenge be brought within five working days, and Syringa did not 
comply with that requirement. As the District Court concluded, and as discussed in detail below, 
Syringa's failure to bring its challenge within five working days constitutes a failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies. R., p. 1156 (Substitute Memorandum Decision and Order). 
Syringa cannot have it both ways. In order to challenge the bid award, Syringa must 
establish that it fits within the statute granting limited rights of challenge. If it has a right to 
challenge under the statute, it must then exhaust its administrative remedies in bringing its 
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challenge. See Sabre Constr. Corp. v. County ofFairj(1x, 256 69-71(Va.1998) ("The 
Public Procurement Act not only creates the substantive right to file an action against a county, 
but also imposes a special limitation on that right, namely appealing the written decision of the 
public body within ten days. When a special limitation is part of the statute creating the 
substantive right, the limitation is not merely a procedural requirement, but a part of the newly 
created substantive cause of action."). 
Syringa's contradictory positions would render meaningless Idaho Code § 67-5733 's 
standing limitations and exhaustion requirements. Under Syringa's argument, a subcontractor 
with no right to challenge under Idaho Code § 67-5733 would have challenge rights than parties 
given a statutory right of challenge because they would not be required to comply with the 
statute's exhaustion requirements before filing a judicial action. 
Syringa cannot question that the Legislation for the Idaho Education Network is also 
contained in Title 67, Chapter 57. Even if standing is somehow conferred upon Syringa then 
Syringa was a part of the same administrative process as Qwest, ENA and Verizon and 
necessarily must be held to the same process for administrative appeals and judicial review as 
provided in Title 67, Chapter 52 and Chapter 57 of the Idaho Code. 
"As a general rule, a party must exhaust administrative remedies before reso1iing to the 
court to challenge the validity of administrative acts." Lochsa Falls, LLC v. State of Idaho, 
147 Idaho 232, 237, 207 P.3d 963, 968 (2009) (quoting KMST, LLC v. County of Ada, 
138 Idaho 577, 583, 67 P.3d 56, 62 (2003)). The Administrative Procedures Act ("APA") 
requires an exhaustion of the "full gamut" of administrative remedies before judicial review may 
be sought. Id.; J.C.§ 67-5271 (citations omitted). "[I]mportant policy considerations underlie 
the requirement for exhausting administrative remedies, such as providing the opportunity for 
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mitigating or curing errors without judicial intervention, deferring to the administrative processes 
established by the Legislature and the administrative body, and the sense of comity for the quasi-
judicial functions of the administrative body." Blanton v. Canyon County, 144 Idaho 718, 721, 
170 P.3d 383, 836 (2007) (quoting White v. Bannock County Commissioners, 139 Idaho 396, 
401-02, 80 P.3d 332, 33 7-38 (2003)). Consistent with these principals, courts infer that statutory 
administrative remedies implemented by the legislature are intended to be exclusive. Lochsa 
Falls, supra, 147 Idaho at239; Park v. Banbwy, 143 Idaho 576, 579, 149 P.3d 851, 853-854 
(2006) (quoting Regan v. Kootenai County, 140 Idaho 721, 724, 100 P.3d 615, 618 (2004), 
internal citations omitted); see also Wheeler v. Idaho Transportation Dep 't, 148 Idaho 378, 
223 P. 3d 761 (2010) (the reviewing court acting in its appellate capacity under IDAPA does not 
substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence presented, and 
defers to the agency's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous .... In other words, the 
agency's factual determinations are binding on the reviewing court, even where there is 
conflicting evidence before the agency, so long as the determinations are supp01ied by 
substantial and competent evidence in the record (citation omitted)). 
The factual record is undisputed that Syringa did not exhaust the administrative remedies 
called for under J.C. § 67~5733 to present a challenge to the multiple a\vard specifications in the 
RFP and ID A's award to Qwest and to ENA. R., p. 745 (Affidavit of Bill Burns at~~! 10-11); R. 
at 73 3-34 (Affidavit of J. Michael Gwartney at~ fl 3-9); R. at 1155 (Substitute Memorandum 
Decision and Order). Syringa concedes, as the District Court properly stated, that the 
administrative appeal requirements of J.C. § 67-5733 apply to actions of the Division of 
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Purchasing as io bid challenges to s Brief al 
R., pp. 1154-55. 
4 J.C. § 67-5733(1 )(a) "There shall 
notice, a period of not more ten (I 0) working clays in , qualified and 
able to sell or supply to items to be acquired, may notify in writing the Administrator of the 
Division of Purchasing of his intention to challenge the specifications and shall specifically 
state the exact nature of his challenge. A specific challenge shall describe the location of the 
challenged portion or clause in the specification document, unless a challenge concerns an 
omission, explain why any provision should be struck, added or altered, and contain 
suggested corrections. 
Upon receipt of the challenge, the Administrator of the Division of Purchasing shall either 
deny the challenge, and such denial shall be considered the final agency decision, or he shall 
present the matter to the Director of the Department of Administration for appointment of a 
determination's officer. If the Director of Department Administration appoints the 
determination's officer, then all vendors, who arc invited to bid on the property sought to be 
acquired, shall be notified of the appeal and the appointment of determination's officer and 
may indicate in writing their agreement or disagreement with the challenge within five (5) 
days. The notice to the vendors may be electronic. Any vendor may note his agreement or 
disagreement with the challenge. The determination's officer may, on his own, motion, 
refer the challenge p01iion and any related portions of the challenge to the author of the 
specifications to be rewritten with the advice and comments of the vendor's capable of 
supplying the property; rewrite the specification himself and/or reject all or any part of any 
challenge. If specifications are to be rewritten, the matter shall be continued until the 
determination's officer makes a final determination of the acceptability of the revised 
specifications. 
The Administrator shall reset the bid opening no later than fifteen (I 5) days after final 
determination of challenges or the amendment of the specifications. If the Administrator 
denies the challenge, then the bid opening date shall not be reset. 
The final decision of the determination's officer or Administrator on the challenge to 
specifications shall not be considered a contested case within the meaning of the 
Administrate Procedure Act; provided that a vendor disagreeing with specifications may 
include such disagreement as a reason for asking for appointment of a determination's 
officer pursuant to Section§ 67-5733(1)(c) Idaho Code." 
5 "Idaho Code § 67-5733(l)(c) provides that: A vendor whose bid is considered may, within 
five (5) working days following receipt of notice that he is not the lmvest responsible bidder, 
apply to the Director of the Department of Administration for appointment of a 
determination's officer. The application shall set forth in specific terms the reasons why the 
Administrator's decision is thought to be erroneous. Upon receipt of the application, the 
Director shall within three (3) working days: 
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Contrary to s contention, a must exhaust remedies 
resorting to the Court to challenge the validity of administrative acts. See Lochsa Falls, LLC v. 
State of Idaho, 147 Idaho 232, 237, 207 P.3d 963, 968 (2009). The Idaho Supreme Court has 
made it clear that the APA requires an exhaustion of the "full gamut" of administrative remedies 
before judicial review may be sought. Id.; I.C. § 67-5271. Syringa would have this Court ignore 
this well-established stare decisis and the provisions of Chapter 52, Title 67, of the Idaho Code, 
based upon the argument that its declaratory relief claims are not subject to LC. § 67-5733 
because: (1) Syringa was not a vendor whose bid is considered; and (2) Idaho Code § 67-5733 
provides no post-contract administrative remedy. Syringa's Brief at 32. Syringa's argument is 
(i) Deny the application, and such denial should be considered the final agency decision; or 
(ii) Appoint a determination's officer to n~view the record to determine whether the 
Administrator's selection of the lowest responsible bidder is correct; or 
(iii) Appoint a determination's officer with authority to conduct a contested case hearing in 
accordance with the provisions of Chapter 52, Title 67, Idaho Code. 
A determination's officer appointed pursuant to Section 67-5733(1)(c)(ii), Idaho Code, shall 
inform the Director by written recommendation whether, in his opinion, Administrator 
selection of the lowest responsible bidder is correct. The determination's officer in making 
this recommendation may rely on the documents of record, statements of employees of the 
State of Idaho participating in any phase of the selection process, and statements of any 
vendor submitting a bid. A contested case hearing shall not be allowed and the 
determination's officer shall not be required to solicit statements from any person. Upon 
receipt of the recommendation from the determination's officer, the Director shall sustain, 
modify or reverse the decision of the Administrator on the selection of the lowest 
responsible bidder or the Director may appoint a determination's officer pursuant to Section 
67-5733(1)(c)(iii), Idaho Code. 
A determination's officer appointed pursuant to Section 67-5733(1)(c)(iii), Idaho Code, 
shall conduct a contested case hearing and upon conclusion of the hearing shall prepare 
findings of fact, conclusions of law and a recommended order for the Director of the 
Department of Administration. Upon receipt of the findings of fact, conclusions of law and 
recommended order, the Director shall enter a final order sustaining, modifying or reversing 
the decision of the Administrator on the selection of the lov,rest responsible bidder." 
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untenable and runs contrary to the important policy considerations ttndcriying the requirement 
for exhausting administrative remedies. Blanton, supra, 144 Idaho at 721. 
It is disingenuous for Syringa to argue that it was not a vendor subject to the 
administrative appeal requirements of Id<tho Code § 67-5'/33(1)(a). Idaho Code § 67-5716 
defines a "vendor" as "a person or entity capable of supplying property to the state." On 
December 29, 2008, IDA, the office of Chief Information Officer ("OCIO"), hosted an RFP 
Vendor Conference to solicit questions and input in response to the RFP. R., p. 726 (Affidavit of 
Mark Little at if 6). The IEN Bidder's Conference Q&A Follow-up (the "Follow-up") provides 
that, "NOTE: The last day for filing a specification appeal is January 9, 2009." Id. at 727. The 
Follow-up also notes the questions and answers, and in relevant part provides: "Q-5. Is this a 
single or multiple award contract? A-5. It is a multiple award contract." Id 
On December 29, 2008, as a vendor Syringa attended, and is listed as an attendee, the 
"IEN Bidder's Conference." R., Affidavit of Mark Little, disc. 12, Exh. D at 5-7. Greg Lowe 
testified that Syringa was an intended vendor of the IEN in his affidavit as follows: 
8. I concluded, based on my review of the IEN RFP, that the 
Idaho Education Network presented an ideal opportunity 
for Syringa to, in conjunction with an appropriate E-
Educational Services Provider, provide hi-speed 
connectivity to Idaho schools, libraries and institutions. I 
felt that Syringa was especially well qualified to provide 
this backbone because I believed Syringa's fiber network 
provided the most cost effective broadband service 
available in significant parts of the state. 
9. Section 3.2 of the IEN RFP asked for a "total end-to-end 
service support solution." 
10. Section 3 .2 of the IEN RFP also encouraged "teaming" the 
potential contractors as follows: 
Within the context of this Rl?P, the State is asking 
potential industry partners to describe a business model that 
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wm initiate to 
stated above, the State is looking for an industry partner or paiiners 
who will take the initiative in areas of network design, network 
management to include operations, maintenance and accounting 
processes. It should be noted that highest consideration will be 
given to the partner or partners presenting the best and most cost 
effective "total end-to-end service support solution" and 
supporting network architecture, which is also Complaint with the 
specifications of this RFP. 
12. Syringa and Education Networks of America, Inc. 
combined, in response to recommendation in Section 3.2 of 
the IEN RFP quoted above, for the purpose of preparing a 
response to the IEN RFP and to provide the "total end-to-
end service support solution" solution the RFP reqtiested. 
13. Syringa and Education Net\vorks of America, Inc. and its 
wholly owned subsidiary ENA Services, LLC (collectively 
"ENA") entered into a Teaming Agreement for the purpose 
of responding to the IEN RFP and to establish who "ENA 
or Syringa" would be responsible for the provision of each 
of the services requested by the RFP in the event our 
proposal was accepted. 
R., pp. 567-69 (Affidavit of Greg Lowe) (emphasis in original). As further testified to by Greg 
Lowe, and specifically stated in the IEN Alliance Proposal to the RF'P, Syringa was proposed as 
the "prime supplier" of connectivity services for the IEN. fd. at 569 (Affidavit of Greg Lowe at 
~ 15). 
Counts 2 and 3 of the Complaint seek declaratory relief for the alleged violation of the 
multiple award statute, LC. § 67-5718(A), based upon the argument that the specifications of 
RFP 02160 do not support the IDA' s decision to make a multiple award of the contract. In the 
RFP and its amendments, IDA announced its intention to make a multiple award. R., p. 1156 
(Substitute Memorandum Decision and Order). As a vendor, under the administrative appeal 
provisions of I.C. § 67-5733(1)(a), Syringa had the right to challenge the multiple award 
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specifications set fmih in the RFP and its amendments. Syringa not assert its rights as a 
vendor under LC. § 67-5733(l)(a). Consequently, it waived its rights to challenge the multiple 
award specifications. That was Syringa' s sole avenue to challenge the multiple award 
specifications. Id.; see F'ieldturf; Inc. v. State Dep 't of Admin., Div. of Public Works, 140 Idaho 
385, 94 P.3d 690 (2004) (failure to exhaust administrative remedies deemed fatal to right to 
pursue judicial challenge); see Lochsa Falls, LLC, supra, 14 7 Idaho at 23 7. 
Notably, in Syringa's brief, it has failed to make any argument as to why the District 
Court erred in its decision to dismiss Counts 2 and 3 due to Syringa's failure to challenge the 
multiple award specifications pursuant to I.C. § 67-5733(1)(a). See Syringa's Brief at 32-34.2 
Syringa's failure to challenge the specifications of the RFP under I.C. § 67-5733(1)(a) was fatal. 
Syringa is now barred from its attempt to circumvent the requirements to exhaust administrative 
remedies. 
Syringa' s sole argument presented on appeal is that I. C. § 67-573 3 (1 )( c) is not applicable 
because it was not a "vendor whose bid is considered" and because I.C. § 67-573 3 provides no 
post-contract administrative remedy. Syringa's Brief at 32. In the Complaint, Syringa alleged 
that it was a joint bidder with ENA in that, "Syringa and ENA jointly submitted a response to the 
IEN RFP as the IEN alliance ("IEN Alliance Proposal"). R., p. 23, ~ 26. Syringa further alleged 
that IDA did not reject the IEN Alliance Proposal as a non-responsive or a nonresponsible bid 
and that on January 20, 2009, the Division of Purchasing issued a Letter oflntent to award the 
RFP to both Qwest and the IEN Alliance. R., p. 24, ~ iJ 30-31. At the heart of Syringa's 
6 Syringa's only argument presented to this Court is under I.C. § 67-5733(1)(c); R., pp. 1150, 
1155 (fn 9), and 1156 (Substitute Memorandum Decision and Order). 
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complaint is its allegation that, "Despite being evaluated by the impartial evaluation team 
selected by DOA as the most technically proficient in every category and the lowest cost bidder 
for the E-Rate portion of the IEN RFP, the DOA issued a multiple award of the IEN RFP to both 
Qwest and the IEN Alliance." R., p. 25, 1f 35. By the admission of Syringa's own pleading, 
Syringa was notified and had knowledge that IDA issued multiple award to Qwest and ENA - -
which SyTinga refers to as the IEN Alliance.2 
At the time of the issuance of the Letter of Intent to Award dated January 20, 2009, 
Syringa had notification that Syringa and/or the IEN Alliance was not the lowest responsible 
bidder, and it should have challenged that decision under LC. § 67-5733(1)(c). R., p. 1156. IDA 
should then have had the opportunity to consider Syringa's challenge as part of the bid process. 
Id. Once again, Syringa's failure to exhaust its administrative remedies is an absolute bar to 
pursue any judicial challenge. See Fieldturf, supra, 140 Idaho at 3 85; James v. Dep 't of 
Transportation, 125 Idaho 892, 895, 876 P.2d 590, 593 (1994) (breach of contract claim barred 
due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies). 
Additionally, Syringa alleged in its breach of contract claim that it and ENA jointly 
submitted the IEN Alliance Proposal in reliance on IDA's solicitation for bids and the 
representations contained in the IEN RFP, and that on January 20, 2009, IDA accepted the IEN 
Alliance Proposal. R., p. 28, ~ ~ 56-57. Syringa also alleged that, "The IEN RFP, IEN Alliance 
Proposal and the DO A's acceptance of the IEN Alliance Proposal created a contractual 
obligation by all parties involved in the transactions to follow the process and criteria contained 
7 Paragraph 3 3 of the complaint alleges that, "The Letter of Intent to A ward indicates that the 
IEN Alliance Proposal - listed by DOA as 'ENA' below - prevailed over Qwest and Verizon 
in every single technical evaluation category and overall cost .... " R., p. 24, 4jI 33. 
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in the IEN RFP." Id. at~! 58. Now, contrary to the allegations in the Complaint that 
accepted Syringa's bid as a part of the JEN Alliance Proposal, Syringa takes the opposite 
position and argues to this Court that it was not a vendor whose bid is considered. 
In essence, Syringa is arguing that the appeal provisions ofl.C. § 67-5733(l)(c) are 
applicable to ENA but not to Syringa. This Court should reject Syringa's argument which runs 
afoul of the prior positions taken by Sy:ringa in this case, Sy:ringa alleged that it was 
participating in the IEN administrative bid process which resulted in the issuance of a multiple 
award that it disagreed with. Therefore, to asse1i an administrative challenge and preserve a 
right to judicial review, Syringa' s compliance with the provisions of I.C. § 67-573 3(1 )( c) was 
mandatory. 
Furthermore, Syringa's argument that it was not "a vendor whose bid is considered" 
places it in a "mousetrap." For instance, if Syringa was not a bidder, then it would only have a 
right as a vendor to administratively challenge the specifications of the RFP, and nothing more. 
Under Syringa's new argument, only ENA as the "vendor whose bid is considered" had a right to 
assert a challenge under I.C. § 67-5733(l)(c). This is highlighted in Syringa's Brief wherein it 
stated, "When ENA learned, aner the issuance of the first SBPO, that the DOA was intending to 
replace Syringa with Qwest as ENA's connectivity provider, ENA could and should have 
asserted that DOA could not do so under I.C. § 67-5718(A)." See Syringa's Brief, pp. 45-46 
(emphasis added). Therefore, under Syringa's theory, because ENA did not assert any challenge 
under I.C. § 67-5733(1)(c), any further action for administrative appeal and subsequent judicial 
review was lost. 
Consequently, Syringa only had standing to complain directly against ENA which it 
did in Count 6 (breach of contract) of the Complaint for the alleged failure of ENA to perform its 
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obligations to Syringa under the Teaming Agreement R., p. 35. Syringa's complaint against 
EN A was outside of the realm of the AP A. However, any and all challenges to the specifications 
or awards by IDA was within the province ofldaho Code§ 67-5733. Syringa's plight ended 
when the District Court properly entered summary judgment on Count 6 of the complaint. R., p. 
2597. 
Syringa's secondary argument that the District Comi erred because I.C. § 67-5733(l)(c) 
provides no post-contract administrative remedy is a red herring and is irrelevant. As discussed 
in detail above, Syringa' s complaint against IDA stems fi:om the legal argument that under the 
specifications of the RFP it was illegal for IDA to make multiple awards pursuant to I.C. § 67-
5718(A). As a vendor, Syringa should have challenged those specifications pursuant to 
I.C. § 67-5733(l)(a). Syringa failed to do so, and its arguments about the awards is surplusage. 
The same analysis applies to reject Syringa' s attempt to excuse its failure to challenge the 
award under I.C. § 67-5733(l)(c). If Syringa was not a vendor whose bid was considered under 
the submission of the IE1\ Alliance's joint proposal, then Syringa had no standing to assert 
challenge, and that right to challenge was otherwise forfeited due to ENA's failure to challenge 
the award under I.C. § 67-5733(l)(c). Syringa is caught in an unavoidable "Catch 22" situation 
under its multiple inconsistent attempts to argue away its failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies. Accordingly, this Court should afiirm the District Court's entry of summary judgment 
on Counts 2 and 3 due to Syringa's failure to exhaust its administrative remedies. 
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D. Court 
Count 4 Of The Cmnpiaint. 
1. 




is Void of any 
to 
In its Decision and Order granting Gwartncy's and Zickau's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on Count 4 (Tortious Interference with Contract), the District Court did not address the 
asse1iion that the Complaint's allegations relating to tmiious interference are fatally defective 
because there are no allegations that Gwartney or Zickau were acting outside the scope of their 
employment or that they acted with malice or with criminal intent. The District Court concluded 
that such an analysis was unnecessary because of its conclusion that Gwartney and Ziehm are 
immune. Although Gwartney and Zickau concur with the District Court's conclusion that they 
are immune under application of I.C. § 6-904(3), they submit that this Court should affirm the 
entry of summary judgment because the allegations in Count 4 are deficient as a matter of law 
and do not assert a viable cause of action for tortious interference with contract against them. 
In asserting the claim of tortious interference with contract against Gwartney and Zickau, 
Syringa seemingly was unaware of Idaho Code § 6-904 (Exceptions to Governmental Liability) 
which provides, in relevant part, that: 
A governmental entity and its employees while acting within the 
course and scope of their employment and without malice or 
criminal intent shall not be liable for any claim which: ... 
3. Arises out of ... , or interference with contract rights. 
l.C. § 6-904(3). "There is a 'rebuttable presumption that any act or omission of an employee 
within the time and at the place of his employment is within the course and scope of his 
employment and without malice or criminal intent."' Anderson v. Spalding, 13 7 Idaho 509, 519 
- 26 -
01152.0105.4939001.2 
50 P.3d 1004, 1014 (2002) (quoting LC. § 6-903(e)). In light of this presumption, a plaintiff's 
burden of showing malice, criminal intent, or action outside the course and scope of employment 
is "particularly high." Boise Tower Associates, LLC v. Hogland, 147 Idaho 774, 784, 215 P.3d 
494, 504 (2009). 
The term "criminal intent," as used in § 6-904(3 ), means "the intentional commission of a 
wrongful or unlawful act without legal justification or excuse, whether or not the injury was 
intended." Anderson v. City of Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 187-188, 731P.2d171, 182-183 
(1986). "Malice" means "actual malice," which is defined as "the intentional commission of a 
wrongful or unlawful act, without legal justification or excuse and with ill will, whether or not 
injury was intended." Id. Malice is thus criminal intent plus ill will: both malice and criminal 
intent require an "intentional commission of a wrongful or unlawful act without legal 
justification or excuse"; malice adds to that the element of ill wil 1. 
An employee's conduct is within the scope of employment if "it is of the kind which he is 
employed to perform, occurs substantially within the authorized limits of time and space, and is 
actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master." Id. (emphasis in original). If the 
employee's conduct "may be regarded as methods ... of carrying out the objectives of 
employment,'' it is vvithin the course and scope of employment, even if the methods are "quite 
improper." Id. (quoting The Richard J and Esther E. Wooley Trust v. DeBest Plumbing, Inc., 
133 Idaho 180, 184, 983 P.2d 834, 838 (2000)). In other words, establishing that an employee's 
acts were outside the course and scope of employment requires more than showing that the acts 
"were carried out improperly." Id. (holding that the evidence showed that alleged acts of 
defamation by state employee were within the scope and course of employment, "even though 
the record indicates they were carried out improperly"). It is only where the employee acts for 
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"purely personal motives ... in no way connected with the employer's interest" that he acts 
outside the course and scope of his employment. Boise Tower Associates, 147 Idaho at 784, 215 
P.3d at 504 (emphasis added). 
Syringa's Complaint, however, makes no allegation that any of the complained-of 
conduct occurred outside the course and scope of employment. Nowhere in the Complaint is 
there any allegation of malice or criminal intent on the part of Gwartney and Zickau. Indeed, 
Count Four alleges acts of Gwartney and Zickau that were committed "within the time and at the 
place of [their] employment" with IDA, thus triggering the statutory presumption against malice, 
criminal intent, or conduct outside the course and scope of employment. R., pp. 17-18 
(Complaint, 97 --104). 
In particular, the Complaint alleges that the following actions by Gwartney and Zickau 
constituted interference with the Teaming Agreement between ENA and Syringa: 
1. Gwartney and Zickau "knew of the existence of the Teaming Agreement between 
ENA and Syringa." 
2. Gwartney and Zickau "knew that should the IEN Alliance be awarded the IEN 
Purchase Order, Syringa would implement the IEN technical network services, local access 
com1ections, and backbone services." 
3. Gwartney and Zickau "instructed ENA to work only with Qwest during the IEN 
implementation despite knowledge of the Teaming Agreement between ENA and Syringa." 
Id.at 97-99,101. 
Paragraph 100 of the Complaint also alleges certain other conduct of Gwartney and 
Zickau, but such alleged conduct is wholly iITelevant to Syringa's claim under Count Four. In 
Paragraph 100, Syringa alleges that IDA, Gwartney, and/or Zickau "have intentionally 
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capriciously, and without authority, informed and directed agencies and political subdivisions 
such as the Idaho Department of Fish and Game, the Idaho Department of Labor, and various 
school districts not to use or contract with Syringa for telecommunications services." Even if 
such allegations were true, however, they have nothing to do with the claim asserted in Count 
Four, tortious interference with the alleged agreement between Syringa and ENA. Whether IDA, 
Gwartney, or Zickau interfered with contracts between Syringa and "agencies and political 
subdivisions" is simply not at all relevant to the inquiry as to whether they interfered with the 
Teaming Agreement between Syringa and a private company, ENA, that is indisputably not an 
agency or political subdivision. The allegations in Paragraph 100 are, therefore, irrelevant to the 
underlying claim and should be disregarded in assessing whether Syringa has alleged conduct 
upon which it could prevail on such claim.Ji 
The allegations upon which Count Four is based are, therefore, that despite their 
knowledge of the Teaming Agreement, Gwartney and Zickau instructed ENA to work only with 
Qwest during the implementation of the IEN. Because each of these allegations concerns 
conduct at the time and place of Gwartney and Zickau's employment, the statutory presumption 
against malice and criminal intent -- and in favor of conduct being within the scope of 
employment -- applies. There is nothing in the Complaint averring -- or even suggesting -- that 
any instruction to ENA occurred outside the course and scope of employment or was made with 
malice or criminal intent. This is fatal to Count Four. See lvfyers v. Pocatello, 98 Idaho 168, 
169-170, 559 P.2d 1136, 1137-38 (1977) (holding that claim of malicious prosecution was not 
~ Even if the allegations in Paragraph 100 were considered as part of the claim for tortious 
interference with contract, the result is the same: the Complaint alleges neither acts outside 
the course and scope of employment nor acts of malice or criminal intent. 
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sufficiently set forth by the language of the complaint because the complaint failed to allege that 
defendant acted with malice; rejecting argument that malice could be inferred from the language 
of the complaint). Syringa has simply "failed to plead clear facts in the [Complaint] to overcome 
the statutory presumption that a government employee acts within the scope and course of his 
employment while employed by the government and at the place of his employment." Johnson 
v. N Idaho College, 350 Fed. Appx. 110, 112 (9th Cir. 2009) (applying Idaho law). As a result, 
this Court should affirm the District Court's entry of summary judgment because Count 4 failed 
to state a claim of tortious interference with contract against Gwartney and Zickau. 
2. The District Court Should be Affirmed because Sydnga Failed to Present 
Evidence of Conduct Implicating the Exceptions to Idaho Code § 6-904(3). 
In the alternative, the District Court's decision granting summary judgment to Gwartney 
and Zickau should be affirmed because Syringa failed to present evidence that Gwartney or 
Zickau acted outside the course and scope of their employment, with malice, or with criminal 
intent See Anderson v. Spalding, 137 Idaho 509, 519, 50 P.3d 1004, 1014 (2002). The 
exception to to11 liability in LC. § 6-904(3) shields Gwartney and Zickau from liability for 
tortious interference with contract. See Rees v. State Dep 't of Health and Welfare, 143 Idaho 10, 
14, 137 P.3d 397, 401 (2006). 
a) Under Idaho law, Gwartney and Zickau arc presumed immune. 
Under Idaho law, there is a presumption that "any act or omission of an employee within 
the time and at the place of his employment is within the course and scope of his employment 
and without malice or criminal intent." Anderson, supra, 137 Idaho at 519, 50 P.3d at 1014. 
Therefore, Gwartney and Zickau are presumed immune from a claim of tortious interference 
with contract. Syringa's burden of overcoming that presumption is "particularly high." Boise 
Tower Associates, LLC v. Hogland, 147 Idaho 774, 784, 215 P.3d 494, 504, (2009). Thus, "In 
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order to survive summary judgment the plaintiff must create a genuine issue of material as to 
whether the statutory presumption has been rebutted." Ander son, supra, 13 7 Idaho at 518, 50 
P.3d at 1013. Syringa has the burden of demonstrating that there is a genuine issue of material 
fact sufficient to overcome the statutory presumption that the conduct of Gwartney and/or Zickau 
was within the course and scope of employment, without malice, and without criminal intent. In 
other words, Syringa has the "particularly high" burden of producing evidence demonstrating 
that Gwartney and Zickau (1) acted for "purely personal motives" that were "in no way 
connected with the employer's interest," (Boise Tower Associates, LLC 14 7 Idaho at 784, 215 
P.3d at 504; (2) intentionally committed a wrongful or unlawful act, without legal justification or 
excuse," Anderson v. City of Pocatello, 112 Idaho at 187-188, 731 P.2d at 182-83 (defining 
criminal intent); or (3) "intentionally committed a wrongful or unlawful act, without legal 
justification or excuse and with ill will." Id. (defining malice). 
b) Syringa has failed to demonstrate on appeal that it presented evidence 
in the record to overcome the statutory presumption of immunity. 
In Syringa's brief, it generally argues that IDA's issuance of the two SBPOs to Qwest 
and ENA and the subsequent amendment to the award violate I.C. § 67-571 S(A) and that 
Gwartney and Zickau are somehow attached to that wrongful or unlawful act. Syringa's Brief at 
51. Under Syringa's argument, whether the SBPOs allegedly violated LC.§ 67-5718(A) is 
irrelevant to its claim for tortious interference with contract against Gwartney and Zickau 
because Syringa has failed to overcome the presumption that Gwartney and Zickau acted within 
the course and scope of their employment in connection with the Division of Purchasing' s 
issuance of multiple awards to Qwest and ENA. Notably, Syringa's brief does not direct this 
Court to any citations in the record which would demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of 
material fact sufficient to overcome the statutory presumption that the conduct of Gwminey and 
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Zickau ~was within the course and scope of employment, without malice, and criminal 
intent. See Syringa's Brief, pp. 52-53. Under I.R.C.P. 56(c), Syringa has failed its burden of 
proof in order to preclude summary judgment. See Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 765 P.2d 126 
(1988). 
Syringa makes a singular reference to the affidavit testimony of Greg Lowe that Mr. 
Gwaiiney told him to keep his criticisms regarding the to himself or "Syringa would never 
get any of the JEN business." Syringa's Brief at 52; R., pp. 1124, 1168. Notably, this Cowi has 
concluded that very similar allegations did not constitute malice. In Beco Const. Co. Inc. v. City 
of Idaho Falls, 124 Idaho 859, 865 P.2d 950 (1993), the plaintiff company's allegation of malice 
rested on evidence that a city councilman had informed one of plaintiff's employees that long 
as I am on the City Cmmcil, Doyle [the president ofBeco] won't do no more \Vork for the City." 
Id, 124 Idaho at 864, 865 P.2d at 955. This Court concluded that, even if the city councilman 
had made such a statement, it would be insufiicient to demonstrate malice on his part absent any 
evidence that he had directed the city attorney to preclude work from flowing to Beco. Id. 
Likewise is the case herein. Even if Gwartney had made the statement alleged by 
Syringa, the record reflects no evidence that Gwartney followed through with his alleged threat. 
Indeed, the statement allegedly uttered by Gwartney was conditional, unlike the unconditional 
promise that no work would flow to Doyle while he remained on the City Council made by 
the city councilman in Beco. Syringa's case is, therefore, significantly weaker than Beco's was. 
Moreover, beyond having no evidence that Gwartney followed through on his alleged threat by 
preventing Syringa from getting any work on the JEN, Syringa also lacks evidence that any of 
the conditions precedent to Gwartney acting on his alleged threat actually occurred -- i.e., that 
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Mr. Lowe failed to keep his criticism to himself or that Gwartney was made aware of any 
subsequent criticisms of IEN by Mr. Lowe. 
Even applying any reasonable inferences from Syringa's skimpy references to the Record 
in its favor, it is apparent that the complained-of conduct was within the course and scope of 
employment and without criminal intent and malice. As a matter oflaw, Gwartney and Zick::m 
cannot be held liable for tortious interference with contract -- in either their official or individual 
capacities. See Pounds v. Denison, 120 Idaho 425, 427-428, 816 P.2d 982, 984-985 (1991) 
(supervisor and president of state university could not be sued in their individual capacities 
because plaintiff failed to re but the statutory presumption that defendants acted in the course and 
scope oftheir employment); Evansv. Twin Falls County, 118 Idaho 210, 216, 796 P.2d 87, 93 
(1990) (affirming grant of summary judgment for defendant because record contained "no 
evidence that the defendants acted with the requisite malice or criminal intent to circumvent the 
exceptions to liability contained in Idaho Code § 6-904(3)"); A1orton v. Lunde, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 44523 (D. Idaho June 19, 2007) (dismissing all claims because the record "is void of any 
evidence that the Defendants were acting with malice or criminal intent"). 
Because the record here is similarly void of evidence that Gwartney or Zickau acted 
outside the course and scope of their employment, acted with malice, or acted with criminal 
intent, Syringa cannot "make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element 
essential to [its] case on which [it] bore the burden of proof." Pounds, 120 Idaho at 428, 816 
P.2d at 985. Consequently, Count Four fails as a matter of law, and the District Court's entry of 





The State Defendants request an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal and on cross~ 
appeal pursuant to I.AR. 40, I.AR. 41, Idaho Code§§ 12-117(1), 12-120(3), and 12-121. The 
basis for this award of attorney fees and the arguments that must be made in this brief in support 
of such request are set forth below in Respondents' Cross-Appeal Brief, and are incorporated 
herein as though fully set forth herein. 
STATE DElj'l~NDANTS' CROSS-APPEAL 
I. 
Respondents IDA, Gwartney and Zickau incorporate by reference the factual background and 
procedural posture set forth above, supplemented by the following:2 Upon entry of the final judgment 
in favor of the State Defendants, they sought an award of costs and attorney fees in the sum of 
$348,052.88 pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 12-120(3) and 12-121.lQ Plaintiff objected to the request for 
fees on the ground that the State Defendants failed to make their claim in accordance with the 
9 On November 28, 2011, the Supreme Court entered an Amended Order Granting Stipulation 
To Augment Record, Lodge Exhibits And Extend Time For Filing Syringa's Brief 
("Amended Order Nov. 28, 2011"), which augmented the record to include 23 documents 
and certain Electronic Exhibits. On December 28, 2011, the Supreme Court entered an Order 
Granting Motion To Augment The Record ("Order Dec. 28, 2011 "), which augmented the 
record to include the Memorandum Decision And Order Re: Costs And Attorney Fees, 
Judgment Re: Costs And Attorney Fees, and Amended Judgment Re: Costs And Attorney 
Fees. Copies of these Orders are attached marked Appendix 1 and 2 respectively. Copies of 
the Memorandum Decision And Order Re: Costs And Attorney Fees, Judgment Re: Costs 
And Attorney Fees and Amended Judgment Re: Costs And Attorney Fees are attached 
marked Attachments 3, 4 and 5 respectively. Reference to these documents described in the 
Orders will be by the title of the document. 
lQ 3/21/11 State Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Request for Costs and Attorney Fees. 
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requirements oficlaho Code§ 12-117.ll The State Defendants subsequently moved to amend their 
claim for fees to add claims under Idaho Code § 12-117 ( 1 )12 and filed a second amendment to assert a 
claim for costs under Idaho Code § 10-121 oJJ. 
The District Court granted the motions to amend the claims for costs and fees.H The District 
Court concluded that the State Defendants were the prevailing paiiy and, accordingly, awarded costs as 
a matter of right to the State Defendants.12 However, the District Court denied the State Defendants' 
claim for attorney fees.12. 
II. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON CROSS-APPEAL 
1. Whether the District Court erred in determining that Idaho Code § 12-117 is the 
exclusive means for awarding attorney fees in favor of state agencies. 
2. Whether the District Court erred in failing to award attorney foes to the State 
Defendants pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3 ). 
3. Whether the District Court erred in failing to award attorney fees to the State 
Defendants pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121. 
ll 4/4/11 Plaintiffs' Objection to the State Defendants' Memorandum of Costs and Attorney 
Fees. 
12 4/22/11 State Defendants' Motion for Leave to Amend Memorandum of Costs and Attorney 
Fees. 
13 4/25/11 Second Motion For Leave To Amend Memorandum Of Costs And Attorney Fees. 
H 514111 Memorandum Decision And Order Re: Costs And Attorney Fees. Attached hereto 





4. Whether the District Court erred in to award attorney fees to the State 
Defendants pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-117(1). 
5. Whether the District Court erred in finding that Syringa has standing.TI 
HI. 
"Interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which [the Supreme Court] exercises free 
review." Smith v. Washington County Idaho, 150 Idaho 388, 390, 247 P.3d 615, 617 (2010) (quoting 
Doe v. Boy Scouts of Am., 148 Idaho 427, 224 P.3d 494, 497 (2009)). "Determining the meaning of an 
attorney-fee statute and whether it applies to the facts are issues of law that [the Supreme Court] freely 




A. The District Court Erred \Vhen it Concluded that Idaho Code § 12-117 is the 
Exclusive Means for Awarding Attorney .Fees to (as Opposed to Against) State 
Agencies. 
1. The Legislative Intent for Awarding Attorney Fees that is Clearly Stated in 
Idaho Code§§ 12-117(1), 12-120(3), and 12-121 Should be Followed by the 
Court. 
This Court has stated that "(i]n order for attorney fees to be awarded pursuant to a statute, 
the statute must clearly contemplate that particular remedy." Sanchez v. State of Idaho, Dept. of 
Correction, 143 Idaho 239, 243, 141P.3d1108, 1112 (2006) ("[IJt is clear that the Idaho 
l1 Standing is a jurisdictional issue that must be addressed before the merits of the case. Young, 
137 Idaho at 104-105. Accordingly, it is addressed at the beginning of this brief as both an 
issue on cross-appeal and as an alternative basis for affirming the District Court's dismissal 
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Legislature has provided f'or the of attorney lv 
., it so inlends, and only 
when it so intends.")). Thus, when the Legislature has clearly, by the plain language of a statute, 
provided for the award of attorney fees, the legislative intent should not be thwarted by the 
courts. 
Further, with respect to statutory construction, as stated by this Court in State v. Schulz: 
The objective of statutory interpretation is to derive the 
intent of the legislative body that adopted the act. Statutory 
interpretation begins with the literal language of the statute. 
Provisions should not be read in isolation, but must be interpreted 
in the context of the entire document. The statute should be 
considered as a whole, and words should be given their plain, 
usual, and ordinary meanings. It should be noted that the Court 
must give effect to all the words and provisions of the statute so 
that none will be void, superfluous, or redundant. When the 
statutory language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of 
the legislative body must be given effect, and the Court need not 
consider rules of statutory construction. 
264 P.3d 970, 974 (Idaho 2011) (internal citations omitted). 
2. Idaho Code§ 12-117(1) is Not Intended to be the Exclusive Authority for 
Awarding Attorney Fees in Favor of State Agencies. 
Idaho Code§ 12-117(1) and (4), as amended in 2010, provides, in relevant part, as 
follows: 
12-117. ATTORNEY'S FEES, WITNESS FEES AND 
EXPENSES AWARDED IN CERTAIN INSTANCES. (1) Unless 
otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative proceeding or 
civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse paiiies a state agency 
or political subdivision and a person, the state agency or political 
subdivision or the court, as the case may be, shall award the 
prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and other 
reasonable expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing party acted 
without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
* * * 
of Syringa's Second and Third causes of action. 
- 37 -
01152.0105.1939001.2 
( 4) For purposes ofihis section: 
(a) "Person" shall mean any individual, partnership, corporation, 
association or any other private organization; 
(b) "Political subdivision" shall mean a city, a county or any 
taxing district. 
( c) "State agency" shall mean any agency as defined in section 67-
5201, Idaho Code. 
I. C. § 12-117(1), (4) (2010) (emphasis added). 
Idaho Code § 67-5201 defines "Agency" to mean each state board, commission, 
depai1ment or officer authorized by law to make rules or to determine contested cases, but does 
not include the legislative or judicial branches, executive officers listed in section 1, article IV, of 
the constitution of the state ofldaho in the exercise of powers derived directly and exclusively 
from the constitution, the state militia or the state board of correction. LC. § 67-5201 (2010). The 
Idaho Department of Administration (IDA) is clearly a state "agency" within the scope of Idaho 
Code §12-117(1). 
As enacted in 1984, section 12-117(1) omitted the proviso, "Unless otherwise provided 
by statute." LC.§ 12-117, as added by Idaho Session Laws 1984, ch. 204, sec. 1, p. 501. It 
simply began with the language, "[i]n any administrative or civil judicial proceeding involving as 
adverse par1ies a state agency and a person .... " Id. The Statement of Purpose to RS 10473 for 
H.B. No. 696, which enacted section 12-117 and is found in the Minutes of the State Affairs 
Committee in the House of Representatives, states that "[t]he purpose of this legislation is to 
provide for the award of costs to a person who is involved in an administrative or judicial 
proceeding where a state agency is the adverse party, and the court finds that the state agency 
acted without any reasonable basis in fact or law." Idaho H. State Affairs Comm. Minutes (47th 
Leg. 2nd Reg. Scss.) (March 12, 1984 ). Clearly, the purpose of the new statute is to provide for 
an award of costs against (as opposed to in favor of) state agencies. 
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In 2000, section 1 117(1) \Vas amended to provide: 
Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative or civil 
judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency, a 
city, a county or other taxing district and a person, the court shall 
award the prevailing patiy reasonable attorney's witness fees 
and reasonable expenses, if the court finds that the party against 
whom the judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in 
fact or law. 
Idaho Session Laws 2000, ch. 241, sec. 1, p. 675. The Statement of Purpose to RS 09456 for S.B. 
1333, which became section l 117(1), states: 
Idaho law presently allows for the recovery of attorney fees against 
public agencies in cases where the public agency frivolously 
pursues or defends the administrative action or civil judicial 
proceeding. There is no general provision for an award of attorney 
fees in favor of the public agency where the other party to the 
action frivolously pursues or defends the administrative or civil 
action. This legislation amends Idaho Code § 12-117 to provide 
that attorney fees may be awarded to state agencies as well as to 
other public entities where the public entity is the prevailing party 
and where the paiiy against whom the judgment is rendered as 
acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
Idaho Senate Judiciary and Rules Comm. Afinutes (55th Leg. 2nd Reg. Sess.) (Jaimary 28, 2000). 
Nothing in section 12-117(1) provides that this section is the exclusive authority for awarding 
attorney fees in favor of state agencies. 
Section 12-117 was amended in 2010 and in 2012, but the amendments do not affect the 
issue now before the Cami in this appeal. See Idaho Session Laws 2010, ch. 29, sec. 1, p. 49; 
Senate Bill No. 1332 (61st Leg. 2nd Reg. Session) (2012). 
3. The District Court Miscomtrued I. C. § 12-117. 
In its Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Costs and A.ttomeys' Fees at p. 20, the 
District Court recognized that, under the plain language ofldaho Code§ 12-120(3) and§ 12-
121, it would appear that the State Defendants may seek attorneys' fees pursuant to these 
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statutes. Nevertheless, based the m Idaho 
Code§ 12-117 is the exclusive means for awarding attorney 111 of slate agencies, the 
District Court denied the requests for attorney fees. Specifically, the District Comi stated: 
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) for ' fees to the 
prevailing party in, among other things, an to recover on rr 
contract related to the purchase or sale of goods, wares, 
merchandise or services, or an action to recover in a commercial 
transaction. Idaho Code § 12-J 20(3). The statute defines "party" to 
mean "any person, partnership, corporation, association, pri vatc 
organization, the state of Idaho or political subdivision thereof" Id. 
Thus, under the plain language of the statue it 'Nonld appear that 
the State Defendants may seek attorneys' fees pursuant to Idaho 
Code§§ 12-120(3) and/or 12-121. 
Several Idaho Supreme Court cases, however, state that Idaho 
Code § 1 117 is the exclush·e means for ing attorney fees 
for state agencies. E.g. Potlatch, 148 Idaho at 635; Westway 
Const., Inc. v. Idaho Transp. Dep't., 139 Idaho 107, 116, 73 P.3d 
721, 730 (2003); State v. Hagerman Water Right Owners, Inc., 130 
Idaho 718, 723, 947 P.2d 391, 396 (1997). In Potlatch, the court 
denied a school district's request for attorneys' fees against a 
school district brought pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121. Id. 
Similarly, the court in Smith v. Washington Coun(y Idaho, 150 
Idaho 388, __ , 247 P.3d 615, 619 (2010) follow·ed Potlatch and 
denied an individual's request for fees pursuant to Idaho Code § § 
12-120(3) and 12-121 against a county. See also Brown v. Ci(y of 
Pocatello, 148 Idaho 802, 811-12, 229 P.3d 1164, 1173-74 (2010) 
(restating Potlatch's holding that Idaho Code § 12-117 is the 
exclusive means for awarding attorney fees for entities to which it 
applies). 
Despite its conclusion that this case is rooted in a commercial 
transaction, the Court is constrained to follow the Supreme Court's 
decisions in the above cases and will decline to consider a request 
for attorneys' fees pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 12-120(3) or 12-121. 
Idaho Code § 12-117 is the exclusive means for awarding attorney 
fees for state agencies. 
8/4/11 Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Costs and Attorneys' Fees-Page 20. 
4. PotlatcfJ Does not Establish that State Agencies are Precluded from Seeking 
an Award of Attorney Fees under Code§§ 12-120(3) or 12-121. 
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In Potlatch Educ. Ass 'n & Doug Richards v. Potlatch Sch. Dist., 148 Idaho 630, 226 P.3d 
12 77, 1282 (2010), this Court stated, "I. C. § 12- 117 is the exclusive means for a~warding attorney 
fees for the entities to which it applies." This statement was dicta (as unnecessarily broad) and 
"should not be considered as having altered or overruled sub silentio the rule established by the 
Court's earlier decision[s]." State v. Doe, 146 Idaho 386, 388-89, 195 P.3d 745, 747-748 (Ct. 
App. 2008). Even if not dicta, it was manifestly wrong (for all the reasons stated below) and 
should be corrected. Farber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 2012 Ida. LEXIS 3 7 (Idaho January 27, 
2012) ("Where a holding establishing precedent on a question of law is manifestly wrong, we 
should correct it."). Moreover, it is (1) unsupported by reasoning, analysis, or authority; (2) 
contrary to the express terms of Section 12-120(3); (3) contrary to the acknowledged purpose of 
the definition of paiiies in Section 12-120(3); (4) contrary to the express terms of section 12-117 
("notwithstanding any other statute ... "); (5) contrary to prior authority (numerous pre-Potlatch 
cases in which the Court either awarded attorney fees under sections 12-120 or 12-121 or 
evaluated whether fees were warranted under those sections); and (6) unsupported by subsequent 
cases (several times the post-Potlatch Court has awarded fees pursuant to Sections 12-120 or 12-
121 (or at least considered and evaluated the issue)). Although several cases have followed/cited 
Potlatch for the exclusivity of section 12-117, none has supported it with reasoning or analysis, 
and none has addressed the conflict with the statutory language. 
In Potlatch, the Court stated that "I.C. § 12-117 is the exclusive means for awarding 
attorney foes for the entities to which it applies." Id. Although this statement superficially 
supports the District Court's conclusion, upon closer scrutiny the statement cairnotjustify the 
conclusion of the District Court, for several reasons. 
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First, at issue in Potlatch was a request for under Idaho Code§ 12-121, not 
§ 12-120(3). As a result, the Potlatch court did not address any claim under§ i2-120(3), and it 
is therefore unclear whether the Potlatch court even intended its proclamation to apply to claims 
for attorney fees by state agencies under§ 12-i20(3). If the court did so intend, the statement is 
merely dicta insofar as it applies to Idaho Code§ 12-120(3). 
Second, the cases on which the Potlatch court relies, Westway Const., Inc. v. Idaho 
Transp. Dep't, 139 Idaho i07, 116, 73 P.3d 721, 730 (2003), and State v. Hagerman Water Right 
Owners, Inc., 130 Idaho 718, 723, 947 P.2d 391, 396 (i997), each held only that§ 12-117 is the 
whether§ 12-117 is the exclusive basis for an award of attorney fees in favor of a state agency. 
Potlatch would thus impose a limitation upon the ability of a state agency to seek attorney fees 
that was previously unknown in Idaho. Moreover, it did so without explanation or analysis, and 
by merely relying on case law that was inapplicable to the issue of attorney fee claims Qy a state 
agency. As a result, the statement in Potlatch is not just dicta, it is unreasoned, unsupported 
dicta that would create new law. 
Third, to the extent that Potlatch is intended to apply to Idaho Code § 12-120(3), it is 
contrary not only to the express terms of that statute but to the many cases applying that statute 
to claims for attorney fees by state agencies or political subdivisions. 
Idaho Code § 12-120(3) expressly applies to situations in which a state agency such as 
the IDA is a prevailing party in a civil action. That section provides: 
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, 
note, bill, negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to 
the purchase or sale of goods, wares, merchandise, or services and 
in any commercial transaction unless otherwise provided by law, 
the prevailing lli!!1Y shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to 
be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs. 
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I. C. § 12-120(3) (2001) (emphasis added). The statute 
The term "party" is defined to mean any person, partnership, 
corporation, association, private organization, the state of Idaho or 
polijical sghgivisiOJLthereof. 
Id. (Emphasis added.) Notably, ihe Legislature added the statutory definition "pa11y" in 1987 
to "allow recovery of attorney !;iy the slate against a Rrivate J?affi[.]" Department of Health 
and Welfare v. Sandoval, 113 Idaho 186, 192 n. 10, 742 P.2d 992, 998 (1987) (emphasis added). 
It is clear that the Legislature intended § 12-120(3) to apply in the circumstances of this 
case. There is no dispute that the facts herein fit within § 12-120(3): it cannot be disputed that 
IDA is a "political subdivision" of the state ofldaho, that IDA was the prevailing party below, or 
that the gravamen of Syringa's lawsuit against IDA was a commercial transaction.18 But the 
Potlatch court does not even acknowledge, let alone address, such statutory language. The 
court's unreasoned dicta would effectively write out of the statute the definition of "party" that 
the Legislature expressly included within it and effectively nullify the Legislature's amendment 
of the statute with neither justification nor analysis. 
The Idaho Supreme Court routinely awarded attorney fees to state agencies (including the 
IDA) and political subdivisions pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 12-120(3) and 12-121-- before 
Potlatch. See, e.g., lvt re University Place/Idaho Water Center Project, 146 Idaho 527, 544, 199 
U Notably, because Syringa sued IDA for breach of contract, there is an independent ground on 
which § 12-120(3) applies, even though there was no contract between IDA and Syringa. 
Beco Construction Company, Inc. v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc., 145 Idaho 719, 184 P. 3d 844, 
(2008); Blimka v.lvfy Web Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723, 728, 152 P.3d 594, 599 (2007) 
(quoting E.I. Dupont De Nemours and Co., 117 Idaho 780, 784, 792 P .2d 345, 349 (1990)). 
See also Jn re University Place/Idaho Water Center Project, 146 Idaho 527, 544, 199 P.3d 
l 02, 119 (2008) (upholding grant of attorney fees to City of Boise's urban renewal agency 




P.3d 102, 119 (2008) (upholding grant of attorney to City of 's urban agency); 
Primary Health Network, Inc. v. State, Dept of Adrnin., 137 Idaho 663, 670-671, 52 P.3d 307, 
314-315 (2002) (upholding decision of District Court to grant attorney fees to IDA); Clark v. 
State, Dept. of Health and Welfare, 134 Idaho 527, 532, 5 P.3d 988, 993 (2000) (awarding State 
attorney foes on appeal); Hummer v. Evans, 132 Idaho 830, 833, 979 P.2d 1188, 1191 (1999) 
(awarding attorney fees to state superintendent of schools). This Court has also granted attorney 
fees to state agencies or political subdivisions pursuant to other subsections of Idaho Code § 12-
120. Scott Beckstead Real Estate Co. v. City of Preston, 147 Idaho 852, 857, 216 P.3d 
141, 146 (2009) (holding that City was entitled to attorney fees under § 12-120(1 )). 
Moreover, this Co mt has continued to award fees tu state agencies pursuant to § 12-
120(3) or§ 12-121 even after the Potlatch decision. Zingiber Inv., LLC v. Hagerman Highway 
Dist., 150 Idaho 675, 687, 249 P.3d 868, 880 (2011) (awarding attorney fees to Hagerman 
Highway District pursuant to § 12-121 ); Doe v. Idaho Dept. of Heal th & Welfare, 15 0 Idaho 491, 
497, 248 P.3d 742, 748 (2011) (awarding attorney fees to the Department of Health and Welfare 
pursuant to§ 12-121); Sadid v. Idaho State University, 265 P.3d 1144, 1154 (Idaho 2011) 
(awarding attorney fees to state university under§ 12-120(3)). See also Stoddart v. Pocatello 
School Dist. #25, 149 Idaho 679, 687, 23 9 P .3d 784, 792-93 (2010) (evaluating school district's 
claim for attorney fees pursuant to § 12-121 and rejecting claim on basis that plaintiff's appeal 
was not frivolous). 
These pre- and post-Potlatch decisions are consistent with the definition of "party" in 
§ 12-120(3). They are also consistent with the terms of§ 12-117(1), which defers to§ 12-
120(3). As discussed above, section 12-117(1) begins with the proviso, "Unless otherwise 
provided by statute .... " There is no question that § 12-120(3) is a statute that "otherwise 
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provide[s]" for attorney a result, by its ovvn terms, § 1 117(1) cannot control whern 
§ 12-120(3)applies. 
Notably, the Potlatch Court's quotation of§ 12-117 omits the language, "[u]nless 
othe1wise provided by statute .... " The Court, purporting to quote§ 12-117(1), stated: 
Section 117(1) provides: 
[I]n any administrative or civil judicial proceeding involving as 
adverse parties a state agency, a city, a county or other taxing 
district and a person, the court shall award the prevailing party 
reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and reasonable expenses, if 
the court finds that the party against whom the judgment is 
rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
148 Idaho at 635, 226 P.3d at 1282. The correct language of§ 12-117(1), as amended in 2000, 
states: 
Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative or civil 
judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency, a 
city, a county or other taxing district and a person, the com1 shall 
award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees 
and reasonable expenses, if the court finds that the party against 
whom the judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in 
fact or law. 
(Emphasis added.) Obviously, the omission of the qualifying language, which is a clear reference 
to the other statutory provisions that authorize an award of attorney fees, including§§ 12-120(3) 
and 12-121, changes the meaning of the statute and the legislative intent for the statute. 
In Department of Health and Welfare v. Sandoval, 113 Idaho 186, 192 n. 10, 742 P.2d 
992, 1987 (Ct. App. 1987), the Court of Appeals acknowledged that§§ 12-120 and 12-121 were 
amended in 1987 to allow recovery of attorney fees by the state against a private party under 
certain circumstances. 
The unnecessarily broad dicta in Potlatch cannot overcome the long line of cases 
awarding attorney fees to state agencies or political subdivisions or the express language of 
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Idaho Code§§ 12-117(1) and 12-120(3). The Potlatch Court did not or 
distinguish" any of its earlier decisions, nor did it "overtly discount the greater weight of 
authority and line of authority"; as a result, its dicta about the exclusivity of Idaho Code § 12-117 
"should not be considered as having altered or overruled sub silentio the rule established by the 
Court's earlier decision[sj." State v. Doe, 146 Idaho 386, 388-89, 195 P.3d 745, 747-748 (Ct. 
App. 2008). See Shelton v. Diamond Intern. Corp., 108 Idaho 935, 940-941, 703 P.2d 699, 704-
705 ( 1985) ("There was no call for the Court of Appeals to instead declare new law and overrule, 
sub silentio, ... a long line of cases dating back over 80 years."). 
Similarly, the Potlatch court did not cite, discuss, or distinguish Idaho Code§ 12-120(3), 
let alone explain why the deferential language in § 12-117 (1) should not be given effect. Rather 
than provide statutory interpretation or construction, the Comi improperly rev.Tote those statutes 
sub silentio. Sanchez v. State, Dept. of Correction, 143 Idaho 239, 246, 141P.3d1108, 
1115 (2006) (Eismann, J., concurring) (Idaho Supreme Court "does not have the poi.ver to 
rewrite [statutes]. Doing so is simply a blatant abuse of power and a violation of the separation of 
powers."); lvfagic Valley Newspapers, Inc. v. Afagic Valley Reg. Med. Center, 138 [daho 143, 
146, 59 P.3d 314, 317 (2002) ("we do not have the authority to rewrite the statute"); Bogner v. 
State Dept. a/Revenue and Taxation, State Tax Com'n, 107 Idaho 854, 856, 693 P.2d 1056, 
1058 (1984) (comis lack authority to rewrite a statute). 
5. Smith v. Washingto11 County Suffers from the Same Infirmities as Potlatch. 
Smith v. Washington County Idaho, 150 Idaho 388, 392, 247 P.3d 615, 619 (2010) quotes 
Potlatch's proclamation about§ 12-117 in support of its ruling that a private party seeking 
judicial review of an agency decision could not seek attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3). 
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For two reasons, the Washington County court's reiteration of Potlatch is even less convincing 
than Potlatch. 
First, Washington County Court's statement is twice dicta. The Court noted that although 
the plaintiff had requested attorney foes under § 12-120(3) in his brief, the plaintiffs attorney 
"expressly \Vaived any claim for fees under these provisions" at oral argument. Id. The 
applicability of§ 12-120(3) was, therefore, not before the Court. Moreover, the Court had 
already determined that a petition for judicial review was not a civil action because it was not 
"commenced by the filing of a complaint with the court," but was, instead, an "administrative 
judicial proceeding." Id. at 618. Because Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) applies, by its terms, only to a 
"civil action," the Court had already effectively ruled that it was not applicable to a petition for 
judicial review of an agency decision. 
Second, the Washington County court relied on Potlatch and the cases cited by Potlatch 
in support of its conclusion that§ 12-120(3) did not apply. For the reasons set forth above, those 
cases do not support a conclusion that§ 12-120(3) is precluded by§ 12-117.12. Moreover, the 
Washington County ease involved only a request for attorney fees against the county. The Court 
did not, therefore, hold that § 12-120(3) is not applicable to attorney fee requests fil'. a state 
agency or political subdivision. 
Importantly, like Potlatch, the Washington County court failed to address the express 
statutory language of Idaho Code § 12-120(3) or the numerous eases under which the Court had 
12. The Washington County court also cited Johnson v. Blaine Cnty., 146 Idaho 916, 929, 204 
P.3d 1127, 1140 (2009), in support of its conclusion, but the Blaine County court merely held 
that fees for a petition for judicial review of a county's decision are not awardable under 
Idaho Code § 12-121. 
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previously awarded attorney fees to state agencies and political subdivisions under that statute 
and under§ 12-121. Nor did the Court rule - or even suggest that the language of§ 12-120(3) 
was unclear or ambiguous, that the statute was unconstitutional, or that the "unless otherwise 
provided by statute ... " language of§ 12~ 117 (1) meant something other than what it said. The 
Court did not acknowledge that its broad statement conflicted with numerous precedent, let alone 
distinguish any ofthose cases. In short, the statement about the exclusivity ofldaho Code§ 12-
117 in Washington County is as infirm as the statement in Potlatch on which it relied if not 
more so. 
For these same reasons, Sopatykv. Lemhi County, 264 P.3d 916, 925 (Idaho 2011) ("This 
Court has already explicitly held that § 12-117 is the exclusive means for seeking attorney's fees 
against the entities to which it applies.") is inapplicable here. Whether § 12-117 is the exclusive 
provision for attorney fees in appeals of administrative decisions is not dispositive on the 
question whether§ 12-120(3) applies h1 civil actign~.· Indeed, the Court's rationale for holding 
that § 12-117 is the exclusive provision for attorney fees in appeals of administrative decisions is 
expressly predicated on its conclusion that an appeal of an administrative decision is not a civil 
action. While it makes sense to conclude that§ 12-120(3), which by its very terms applies to 
civil actions, does not apply to cases that are not civil actions, it defies logic to extend that 
reasoning to civil actions. Moreover, in Sopatyk, the Court correctly stated that the restriction in 
§ 12-117 applies when the claim for attorney's fees is against state agencies, rather than in favor 
of state agencies. 
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is to All 
Under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3). 
Section 12-120(3) provides: 
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, 
note, bill, negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to 
the purchase or sale of goods, wares, merchandise, or services and 
in any commercial transaction unless otherwise provided by law, 
the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to 
be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that an award of attorney fees is mandatory in cases 
arising out of a commercial transaction. Afeyers v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 283, 292, 221P.3d81, 91 
(2009) ("The court must always award attorney fees to the prevailing paiiy 'in commercial 
transactions."'). An award of attorney fees is required where "the case involves a 'commercial 
transaction' and that such transaction is the gravamen of the lawsuit." Bream v. Benscoter, 139 
Idaho 364, 370, 79 P.3d 723, 728 (2003). 
A "commercial transaction" is defined as "all transactions except transactions for 
personal or household purposes." LC. § 12-120(3). "Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) docs not require 
that there be a contract between the parties before the statute is applied; the statute only requires 
that there be a commercial transaction." In re University Place/Idaho Water Center Project, 146 
Idaho 527, 541, 199 P.3d 102, 116 (2008). Moreover, this Court "has given a broad meaning to 
the word 'transaction."' Id. "The commercial transaction ground in I.C. § 12-120(3) neither 
prohibits a fee award for a commercial transaction that involves tortious conduct ... nor docs it 
require that there be a contract." Blimka v. Nfy Web Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723, 728, 152 
P.3d 594, 599 (2007)). Here, the State Defendants arc entitled to an award of attorney fees 




The crux of Plaintiff's complaint is IDA v,;as contractually obligated to utilize 
Plaintiff as specified in the IEN Alliance proposal. The first cause of action in Plaintiffs 
Complaint is that the IDA breached a contract with Plaintiff. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that 
the December 2008 IEN RFP constitutes a solicitation for bid for telecommunication services 
and equipment. R., pp. 27-28 (Complaint, 52-53). Plaintiff alleges that it and ENA 
submitted the IEN Alliance Proposal in reliance on the IDA's solicitation for bids. R., p. 28, at 
~ 56. Plaintiff further alleges that the IDA accepted the IEN Alliance Proposal and, thus, 
"created a contractual obligation by all parties involved in the transactions to follow the process 
and criteria contained in the RFP." Id. at 57-58. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that the IDA 
breached its contractual obligations by failing to adhere to the terms of the agreement, i.e., by 
failing to utilize Plaintiff as specified in the IEN Alliance proposal. Id. at n 59-60. 
For purposes of an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3), it does not 
matter whether a contract did or did not exist between Plaintiff and the IDA. All that matters is 
that Plaintiff alleged that it had a contract with the IDA in the nature of a commercial transaction. 
"Where a party alleges the existence of a contract that would be a commercial transaction under 
Idaho Code § 12-120(3), that claim triggers the application of the statute and the prevailing party 
may recover attorney fees even if no liability under the contract is established." Lexington 
Heights Dev., LLC v. Crandlemire, 140 Idaho 276, 287, 92 P.3d 526, 537 (2004). 
The alleged contract was for telecommunication services and equipment, which is a 
"commercial transaction" because it "was not for personal or household purposes." Univ. of 
Idaho Found., Inc. v. Civic Partners, Inc., 146 Idaho 527, 541, 199 P.3d 102, 116 (2008) 
(quoting I.C. § 12-120(3)). Accordingly, the gravamen of Plaintiffs breach of contract claim 
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was a commercial transaction and an award of attorney 
mandatory. 
under Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) is 
All other claims against the State Defendants arose out of the same commercial 
transaction. In Univ. of Idaho Found., Inc., this Comi explained that it gives "broad meaning to 
the word 'transaction."' 146 Idaho at 541, 199 P.3d at 116. The Corni held that multiple 
contracts among different parties constitute one single "transaction" if the contracts related to the 
same purpose. Id., 146 Idaho at 544, 199 P.3d at 119 (holding that, "[a]lthough there were eight 
contracts involving six separate entities, all of the above-mentioned contracts constituted one 
transaction" because "[t]hey were all executed to achieve the Foundation's purpose of 
transferring Unit 101 to the ISBA so that it \Vould construct on Unit 101 the Water Center to be 
used by the University ofidaho"). 
This case similarly involved multiple alleged agreements that constitute one single 
"transaction." The Teaming Agreement between ENA and Syringa and the alleged contract 
created by the IEN RFP and the IEN Alliance Proposal constitute a single commercial 
transaction because each contract related to the provision of telecommunication services and 
equipment to the IDA. 
The fact that Plaintiff's Second and Third causes of action were for declaratory relief 
does not take them outside ofidaho Code§ 12-120(3)'s provision for attorney fees. This Court 
has held that Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) applies to declaratory judgment actions if the gravamen of 
the action is a commercial transaction. Jn re University Place/Idaho Water Center Project, 146 
Idaho 527, 541, 199 P.Jd 102, 116 (2008). Herc, the gravamen of both claims for declaratory 
relief is the same commercial transaction out of which the breach of contract claim arose. 
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Counts Two and Three of Plaintiff's Complaint each alleged that the ID A's award of 
work to Quest -- i.e., the contract to which Plaintiff claims it was entitled -- should be declared 
void pursuant to Idaho Code § 67-5725 because that agreement allegedly did not comply with 
various statutory provisions. R., pp. 30, 33 (Cornplaint, 76, 94). The gravamen of each of 
these claims is the commercial transaction pursuant to which the IDA awarded work to Qwest 
and pursuant to which Plaintiff contends it should have been awarded work. 
Plaintiffs final claim against the State Defendants, Count Four, arises out of the same 
commercial transaction. In Count Four, Plaintiff alleges that the State Defendants tortiously 
interfered with the Teaming Agreement entered into between Plaintiff and ENA. As the District 
Court explained in its February 9, 2011 Memorandum Decision And Order Re: ·Motions For 
Summary Judgment (R., pp. 2555-2597), the basis for this claim was not initially clear. Id. at p. 
26. However, it later became "clear that Syringa asserts that the multiple award to ENA and 
Qwest is the basis, or part of the basis, for the tortious interference claim." Id. at 27, ~ 49. 
("Upon information and belief, Gwartney and Zickau unduly influenced the IEN FRP award to 
Qwest and unduly, unlawfully, and without authority, split and divided the IEN Alliance 
Proposal to deprive Syringa of any of the IEN implementation work."). Thus, the gravamen of 
Plaintiffs tortious interference claim was the commercial transaction to which Plaintiff contends 
it was, or should have been, a party. 
In summary, the State Defendants are entitled to an award of attorney fees under Idaho 




c. The is § 
1. Idaho Code§ 12-121 Provides Fees to 
Prevailing Party ·where the Action was Brought or Pursued Frivolously, 
Unreasonably or Without 
Idaho Code § 12-121 permits an award of reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party 
if the action was brought or pursued frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. See J-U-B 
Engineers, Inc. v. Security Ins. Co. of Hartford, 146 Idaho 311, 318, 193 P.3d 858, 865 (2008). 
Here, Plaintiff brought and pursued its claims unreasonably and without foundation because it 
brought suit without standing to sue and without first exhausting its administrative remedies. 
These doctrines are well established in Idaho law. 
The unreasonableness of this action is further exemplified by Plaintiff's tortious 
interference claim, which was the only claim remaining after the Court's July 23, 2010 Substitute 
Memorandum Decision And Order. R., pp. 1139-1157. To prevail on that claim against 
Defendants Gwartney or Zickau, Plaintiff was required to present admissible evidence that the 
Defendants acted outside the course and scope of employment, with malice or with criminal 
intent. R., pp. 2555-2597, 2582 (Memorandum Decision And Order Re: Motions For Summary 
Judgment). Plaintiff had no such evidence. Despite the clear absence of evidence to suppmi its 
claim, Plaintiff filed an I.R.C.P. 56(f) motion in response to the State Defendants' motion for 
summary judgment and insisted on taking an excessive number of depositions. As the District 
Court recognized, Plaintiff took the depositions of "all, or very nearly all, of the individuals 
involved in the bid solicitation and award process." R., p. 2584. Even after taking all of the 
depositions, Plaintiff still had no admissible evidence to support its to1iious interference claim. 
Bringing a cause of action without standing, failing to exhaust administrative remedies, and 
pursuing a cause of action without a shred of evidence to support that cause of action fits 
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squarely within Idaho Code§ 12~121 's provision for an attorney fee award for an action brought 
or pursued frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. 
D. The IDA is Entitled to Attorney Idaho Code§ 12-U 7(1). 
Idaho Code § 12-117 ( 1) provides authority an award of attorney foes to a state agency 
when the state agency is the prevailing party and the nonprevailing party acted without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law. As described above in Section C.1. of this Cross-Brief, Plaintiff 
lacked standing to bring this action against IDA and failed to exhaust administrative remedies. 
Moreover, it pursued the tortious interference claim 'Nhen it had no admissible evidence to 
support that claim. Bringing a cause of action without standing and without exhausting 
administrative remedies, and pursing a cause of action vvithout admissible evidence to support 
the claim, fits squarely within Idaho Code§ 12-117(1) provision for an attorney fee award 
brought without a basis in fact or law. 
E. The State Defendants' Request For Attorney 1''ccs Is Reasonable Under The Rule 
54(e)(3) Factors that Were Submitted to the District Court. 
The "reasonableness" of an attorney fee award is based on the trial court's consideration 
of the factors in LR.C.P. 54(e)(3). Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc. v. Texas Refinery Corp., 
139 Idaho 761, 769, 86 P.3d 475 (2004). The factors of Rule 54(e)(3) include: time and labor; 
difficulty; skill required; prevailing charges; fixed or contingent fees; time limitations; amount 
and result; undesirability of the case; relationship with the client; awards in similar cases; costs 
of automated research; and any other factors. Id. Attorney fees are a discretionary matter for the 
trial court and are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Id Although a trial court is 
not required to make "specific findings demonstrating how it employed any of the factors in Rule 
54(e)(3)," it is required to consider those factors when determining the amount of fees to award. 





The dismissal of Counts Two and Three against IDA, and Count Four against Gwartney 
and Zickau, should be affirmed. The decision of the District Court denying an award of attorney 
fees for the State Defendants should be reversed and remanded. This Court should award the 
State Respondents their costs and attorney fees incuffed in this appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS }};3_ day of April, 2012. 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
By / .., ;}.h~~ 
Steven F. Schossberger, I~ No. 5358 
Attorneys for Respondents Idaho Department of 
Administration; J. Michael "Mike" Gwartney 
and Jack G. "Greg" Zickau 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this;L3day of April, 2012, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing STATE RESPONDENT'S BRIEF AND CROSS-APPEAL BRIEF by the 
method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following: 
David R. Lombardi 
Amber N. Dina 
GIVENS PURSLEY, LLP 
601 W. Bannock 
P.O. Box 2720 
Boise, ID 83701 
[Attorneys for Plaintiff] 
B. Lawrence Theis 
Steven J. Perfrement 
BRYAN CAVE BRO 
1700 Lincoln Street, Suite 4100 
Denver, CO 80203 
[Attorneys for Qwest Communications Company, LLC] 
Phillip S. Oberrecht 
Leslie M.G. Hayes 
FARLEY OBERRECHT WEST HARWOOD & 
BURKE, P.A. 
702 W Idaho, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 1271 
Boise, ID 83701 
[Attorneys for ENA Services, LLC] 
Robert S. Patterson 
BRADLEY ARANT BOULT CUMMINGS LLP 
1600 Division Street, Suite 700 
Nashville, TN 3 7203 
[Attorneys for ENA Services, LLC] 
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Stephen R. Thomas 
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101 S. Capitol Boulevard, 10th Floor 
P.O. Box 829 
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[Attorneys for Qwest Communications Company, LLCJ 
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ORDER GRr'\NTING STIPULATION 
TO AUGMENT Rl:CORD, LODGE 
EXHIBITS AND EXTEND TIME FOR 
FILING APPELLANT'S tf\:'~r 
~fhWBRIEF 
Supreme Court Docket No. 38735-2011 
Ada County District Court No. 2009-23757 
A STIPULATION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD, LODGE EXHIBITS AND EXTEND 
TIME FOR THE FILING OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF was filed by counsel for the parties on 
November 7, 2011, requesting this Court to allow the addition of the items which were not 
contained in the Clerk's Record on Appeal and Exhibits received by the Supreme Court on 
September I 9, 20 I I. Therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that the parties' STIPULATION TO AUGMENT THE 
RECORD, LODGE EXHIBITS AND EXTEND TIME FOR THE FILING OF APPELLANT'S 
BRIEF be, and hereby is, GRANTED and the District Court Clerk shall prepare an l!,1,ECTRONIC 
AMENDED ORDER GRANTING STIPULATION TO AUGMENT RECORD, LODGE EXHIBITS AND 
EXTEND TIME FOR FILING APPELLANT'S G~8POND£N+ BRIEF - Docket No. 38735-2011 
SUPPLEMENTAL RECORD to include 
counsel ON OR BEFORE FOtJRTEEN (14) 
1. 12/16/10 Atl1davit of 
Motion to Compel 
N. 
documents 
2. 3/21111 l Perfrernent m 
Fees; 
below and file with this Court and 
Plaintiffs Opposition to Qwcst's 
of Memurandum of Costs and 
3. 3/21/11 Defondant Qwest Communications Company, LLC's Memorandum of Costs 
and Attorney 
4. 3/21/11 Defendant Qwest's Brief in Support of Memorandum of Costs and Attorney 
Fees; 
5. 3/21111 State Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees; 
6. 3/21111 State Memorandum in Support of Request Costs and Attorney 
Fees; 
7. 3/21/11 Affidavit of Merlyn W. Clark; 
8. 4/4/11 Piaintiff's to the State Defendants' 1v1emorandum of Costs and 
Attorney Fees; 
9. 4/4/11 Plaintiff's Objection to Qwest Communication Company LLC's Memorandum of 
Costs and Attorney Fees; 
10. 4/4/11 Memorandmn in Support of Plaintiff's Objection to the Qwest Communication 
Company LLC's Memorandum of Costs and Fees; 
11. 4/4/11 Plaintiff's O~jection to ENA's Verified Memorandum of Costs and Attorney 
Fees; 
12. 4/4/l l Memorandum in Suppo1i of Plaintiff's Objection to ENA's Memorandum of 
Costs and Attorney Fees; 
13. 4/22/11 Defendants Qwest Brief in Support of Memorandum of Costs and Attorney 
Fees; 
14. 4/22/l l State Defendant's Motion for Leave to Amend Memorandum of Costs and 
Attorney Fees; 
15. 4/22/11 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave to Amend Memorandum; 
16. 4/22/11 Reply in Support of Verified Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees; 
17. 4/25/11 Second Motion for Leave to Amend Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees; 
18. 4125111 Second Affidavit in Support of State Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees; 
19. 4/25/11 Reply to Plaintiffs Objection to the State Defendants' Memorandum of Costs 
and Attorney Fees; 
20. 5/27/11 Plaintiff's Opposition to the State Defendants Motion for Leave to Amend 
Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees; 
21. 5/31/ 11 Affidavit of David R. Lombardi [in Support of Opposition to Qwest' s 
Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees] 
22. 6/6/11 State Defendants Reply in Support of First and Second Motions for Leave to 
Amend Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees; and 
23. 7/25/11 Supplemental Idaho Supreme Court Authority on Issue re: Expert Witness Fees. 
AMENDED ORDER GRANTING STIPULATION TO AUGMENT RECORD, LODGE EXHIBITS AND 
EXTEND TIME FOR FILING APPELLANT'S Gl~(~£...!WSPGt"'Jl)EN+ BRIEF - Docket No. 38735~201 l 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that this ELECTRONIC SUPPLEMENTAL RECORD shall 
include the following items as EXHIBITS, pursuant to l.A.R. 3l(a)(4): 
1 Electronic Exhibits A-L to the Atfidavit of Mark Little; and 
2. Electronic Exhibits 2 and 3 to the Affidavit of Patrick Roden [FILED UNDER SEAL]. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the due date for the filing of APPELLANT'S 
GROSS RESPGNDEN'f BRIEF shall be reset and Appellant's Brief SHALL BE 
FILED WITH THIS COURT ON OR BEFORE DECEMBER 30, 2011. 
IT FURTHER JS ORDERED that this Order SHALL BE NUNC PRO TUNC to the date 
cc: Counsel of Record 
District Court Clerk 
AMENDED ORDER GRANTING STIPULATION TO AUGMENT RECORD, LODGE EXHfBITS AND 
EXTEND TIME FOR FILING APPELLANT'S CROSS RESPONDENT BRIEF Docket No. 38735-2011 
PPENDIX2 
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IDAHO DEPARTMENT ) 
ADMINISTRATION; J. MICHAEL " ) 
GWARTNEY, in personal and ) . 
capacity as Director and Chief Information ) 
Officer of the IDAHO DEPART~ffNT ) 
ADMINISTRATION; JACK G. "GREG" ) 
ZICKAU, in his personal and official capacity ) 
as Chief Technology Officer and Administrator ) 
of the Office of the CIO; ) 
and 
Defendants-Respondents Cross-
A ppel Ian ts, 
ENA SERVICES LLC, a division of 
EDUCATION NETWORKS OF AMERICA, 
INC., a Delaware corporation; QWEST 
COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY, LLC, a 
















ORJJER GRANTING MOTION TO 
A UG.\1ENT THE RECORD 
Supreme Court Docket No. 38735-2011 
Ada County Docket No. 2009-23757 
A MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD TO INCLUDE CONTENT REQUIRED BY 
LA.R. 28(b )(l) was filed by counsel for Appellant on December 21, 2011. Thereafter, 
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT ENA SERVICES, LLC'S NON-OPPOSITlON TO MOTION TO 
AUGMENT THE RECORD TO INCLUDE CONTENT REQUIRED BY I.A.R. 28(b)(l) was filed 
by counsel for Respondents ENA Services, LLC on December 27, 201 L 
appearing, 
good cause 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellant's MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD be, 
and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation record shall include the documents listed below, file 
stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion: 
1. Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Costs and Attorney Fees, file-stamped August 4, 
2011; 
2. Judgment Re: Costs and Attorney Fees, file-stamped October 27, 2011; and 
3. Amended Judgment Re: Costs and Attorney Fees, file-stamped December 15, 2011. 
DATED this ~ay of December, 2011. 
cc: Counsel of Record 



































0 ~ 2011 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clorl< 
fly MAFffliA LYKE 
Lla'UlY 
IN DISTRICT OF THE FOtTilTH JlJDlClAL DlSTRICT 01~· 
()J? IN AND fOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
SJ:'RJNGA !LC. an Idaho 
Plain ti ft~ 
vs. 
JDA1i0 DEPARTMENT OP 
ADMJNISTRATlON; J. MICHAEL 
"MlKE" GWARTNEY, in 
official c~1pacity as 
Infonnalion. Officer of tlw Idaho 
Dlopartmi;;nt Adrnlriisttation; JACK G. 
"GREG" ZICK.AU, ln his personal and 
officfal capacity as Tc.dmology 
Officer and AdministratDr of the Office Qf 
the CID; ENA SERVICES, LLC, a Division 
of EDUCATION "h"ETWORKS OF 
At\.1'.ERICA, INC., a Oelawitre corporation; 
QWEST COMMUNlCATlONS 
COMP ANY, LLC, a [)elawarc limited 
liability company, 
Defondal'Jt'i. 
Case No. CV~OG-09-23757 
MJ!MORANDU:M DECISION 
ANJ) ORDER RE: COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES 
In separate rn~,tiom:, the Defendants ldaho Department of Admini:mation, J. Michael 
"Mike" Gwartne.y ("Gw:irtney"), Jack G. "Greg'' Zickau ("Zickau") (coilcctively the "State 
DefendaI1ts'i), Education Networks ,,f A.rncrica, Inc. ("ENA") and Qwest Cmnmunications 
22 I 
2 3 
. Company, LLC ("Qw~~st") request costs and attorneys' :fees against Syrlnga Netvvork, LLC 
z4 I ("Syringa"). 111e Comt wi.ll :iward costs as a matter of right! discretionary costs and attorney fees 
.l 
i.s . as discussed below. 
26 

















l!. lrnd pnsviomily granted 
' 
On Murch 8, 101 l, lhi: Cotnt entered Jud:.grnent disn1is:::ing wit11 prejudice Syri.ngii's 
all Defondants. The 
I of the; Coi:.npluint, t:i. Substitnt;~ l\.1eroormiduro. 
in its Mentori'~ndum 
till Febnlill.)' 9, 2011. T.bt~ bac;kgroun<l of 
the case is Sr;it forth d(~taU in thc-se d.edslons. 
State Defendants, :ff,NA a1;id Qwest etwh file.cl a i:ne1.11orand11m of 
costs and attorney 
The Coui:t cond\.1cted a hearing h1to these maifors 01.i June 14, 2011. Stephen R. Thon1asi Moffat~ 
Tb.omas
1 
Rock Fields, Chtd., a.ppeare1t RJ1d argm:d cm behalf of Qwest 1~1tlllip S. l 
Obci>ec]lt anrl l~sli< M. G. Hayes, Hall, F>i!ey, Oborrer.ht & Blanton, P.A.. appeared on hebalf of I 
I FNA, argurneut by J\fr. Ohcrrech.t. Merlyn W. Clark, Hawley Tro:xc:l1 famfa & Hawley LLP, ap:peBJ:ed and argued on belHilf of the State D efct1d{ints. David It. Lomhardl 1 Givens Pursley LLP 
appeared ao.d argued ot1 behalf ofSyringa. The Co-mt took the matters undet anvhe.ment Ou July 
201. l, the State Defo11dants filed.·~ supple.men1.<'1} l11cmorandum dtlng to a recent ldaho 
20 Supren1e Cowit decisim1 regarding the awn.rd of witne.:is fees 
g11idanc.0 for dotenni:JJ,ing the prevoili.ng party fssue is supplied by I.R.C.P. 54{dX2) which provides 
2~. 
as f'ollows: 
In cctern:iining piirty t(1 Elll uction J:i a 
the trl al co1nt sb.~11 in 
of the actior1 i.!1 
C)OUrt i:n 
lR.C.P. 54(d)(2). Th~ detem1:hui.Hon pn:;vaiied is conm1ittcd to the of the trial 
1 comt. Jorgensen v. 538, 224 p l 125, I Shorev. 
a Peterson. 1A6 ldaho 903, 915, 204 P.3d lJ ll26 (2009)). In will !ind th::i.t 




















1.RC.P. 54(d)(l)(C) a party 11Jay rncover as a 
matter of right tts follo\vs: 
L Court :fifo1g 
2. Actnal feei> for '"'"""·· 0 • of plea1ling or docmm:~nt in tbe ~~c1fon ·wheither 
served. by a pubHc or othcrvernuu .. 
3. Witness fc~:s of $20.00 pc;r day for Jay in wbich a witness, 
party or expert, testifie~ at ~1 d1.oposition or in the tifal of an 
4. Travel expenses Clf wih,icsses who travel 1Jy private tre.nsportation, other 1h;u1 a 
party, who testify in 6e trial an ac;tio:n, i;.t.tn1.p11ted at tl1e nlte 
way, froi:n. the place whci.hedt 
Id.alitJ; travel 't:Xpenses of wit.11esses .1Y8.Vel hy pfr'1~tte 
transpc.<JtfLfo:m,. other a party, ccmp.1tcd ati th.c actual travel t~:v;pense of th~~ 
witnes.;; uot to exceed $,30 ]/er mile, 01;.e way, from the 1~lace ofrcij!dence of ihe 
wi.tness, Wlie.ther it be wltl:tin or1vithout the state ofidaho. · 
5. Ex:pense>':J or cltargea of ce1tified cf documems as evldcnce in a 
headng or tria.t ofttn action, 
6. Reasonable costs of the:1 preparation of models, 
other exM.bits adoJ.itted in as in a or tdul of an 











































7. Co$tS of an bond prem1.urns. 
for an t~xpert who testifies at '" S. R..casolli!.hle 
tdal of an 
<l.ppco:n:rnces. 
·A.-~v~.a t1ie snm of $2}000 fi:)r au 




1 O. Charges for one (l) wpy of ~my d[:jpositlon tli.kt~tl by ::u.~y i:)f th•:i pnrties tn the 
11ction in })reparudmJ fbrtri::il ofthe ai:;tfon. 
Notwitlwtar1d.lng tl1e dt:.i.en:nlrmtion that ;:1. purticularpmty .is ·'/l..t'''"''L'"' 
m.a.ttcr of right undt~r th]s subparngraph {C} 
discretion may, upon p:roper objection,. dis~tUow s.ny oft.he: aMve {!J::O>cril1ed C()sl:'> 
\tpon a foJdh1g: that said CQsls wine focu.1:'1:,~d; were .l:n:currt:d for the 
·pclIJ:lO.Si~ oflrnr~ism:>ie:nt~ bad faith; or were inc:11ned for ;.mrpQ3e 
df.incrt~tishrg; the t::ost.<;to otlict pmty, Tl'.w :mere fact that <t depo~;itio11 fa not t1~;ed 
it1 tl10 h:ial of an HCtfo1:::, i:rvid~nce1'ead into the record or for the p111:poses of 
impeachment, shail not indicate t11at the tnki:ng of s'Llch deposition VvflS not 
rea.s011able1 or that a copy t)f a. deposition was not reasonably obtained, or th(lt the 
cost of the deposition should otherwise be disallowed, so fo11g as its taking was 
reasonable i.n the preparation for trial in W.1ie action. 
jI.R.C.P. 54(d)(1 )(C). 
t 
!n addition to costs as a ll'.l.atter of right, 1.R.C.P. 54(d.)(l)(D) provides for the awa.rd of 
discretionl.lry costs afl follows: 
Additional itexns of co.st x1.ot e11un1cnHt;d in, or fo an amount h.1 excess of \J:iat listt:d 
hJ. [I.R.CJ» :54(d)(l(G)], in~ty be allowed upon r1. showing that sl:lid l;.osts were 
l1C:c~ssi::u:y and: exccptioni'i.1 i:t\St\l teasonab1y ir.\ctrrrtd; ·and should. in th~~ 1..nterost .of 
J\i.stice )Je a;;Bess6d ag:shrnt the >\dvcr&!i! p~irly, 'l'h•~· trial .comt, in. 11.iling trpun 
b~:,,, t·.. " ·t'' ,... · " 1- "!'."" "'1'! • · ... • c·;· ,,.,.,. ' · t'·'°'U'"J :·: .,,~l·''· "'°~·11·.,. <n·~''., -f··" .-fr· ·11"' 1: 0 ;it\C lOU1> '.; . .,U,i.;,µ .. {, l<>c..!;L ;()U<l.ly .JS:~,, COil u]J. "'" lJ. U ·" .t<.<v .. <0Glu.l.J.\.f}]. 0 .. 00:.<-1; :\, <LL• 
:i.nake. e:q:ire,~S Jfa.cHngs as la vvhy .such specific 1tem. of disccrctionary cost should or 
sh1)tild i~ot be $lli:;r.'\.ved. In. th~ ahs~·.nce of any objection to such a11. item of 
cliscretion.ru:y cots, thi~ coi.u.i may dfoaUow on it'l ov.tn motion <my mi.ch jtenis of 
discretion~1ry cols and. rJ:1.all t:nake express fmdings suppoxting sUl)h disallo•.vanco. 






tl l 1·: I 'R C P ··A (d' "l )('DI 
"It' " ' •. ' '.. J( ' ;• to 
: 11th• trial COtlft the Ft.shv. 
!! 
, ir!mith, ))I 
1 I onJy the COltrt 
prevailing that they were necessaty, re2.sm1ably incurrc.d, 
against tho udvei·se party in nfjustice. lnama v. Bn..:wer, 132 973 P.2d 
11
148, l (l The party has inithd bmden to an ad1~quate sncb 
9 
Jcosts are necessary reas()nably and th~rt award of sueh would be 
.9 I 
j.ln the hltere$t t1f ju.:rtic:::, Bcco Const. Co., lire. v. Hmper Contracliltg, Inn., 130 I<hiho 4, 11,, 936 
10 t 
11 l P.2d 202, 209 (Ct App. 1997). la it'I t1He; trial c:om:t is not required to I 
i :2 l evaluat~ ~>usts item by hut instead may make findings with regard. to tho genc<l·al 
13 \I character of the reqnosled costs. Ina.ma, Idiho at 384 (citing Fi8h v. Smtth, lJl Idaho 492i 494t 
19 
960 P.2d 175, 177 (1998)). 
Th~ award of attorn.~y is gtlvem.cd by LRC.P. 54(e)(1) which provhies in part: 
rn !'IJJ,y civil actkio tbc cou1t m..ay <l'.¥f!rd reason.ah le attorney fees, wbkh at tl.10 
discretfon. of the coUJ:t may inclmie pmalegat fees, to the pre,1aihng pittfy or 
patties .as define:d in Rule 54(d)(l)(B), when provided fbr by any statute or 
contract 
· l.R.C,P, 54(c)(l). As: to (he at:nount atty awiird~ 1.R.C.P. S4(e)(3) provides several fi4itors 
the Comi lllust consider; 
21 
IJ (A) 'th,;;tfal~::and 
<'! 2 l (13)'I;henoveltya:ud.diffi(;llltyofthc qum.:tions. 
23 1 {C)::J.:'he.Sk.nt te.qui;,.·jte." . pedbm».. . service properly snd the experience t ru1d :abili!:'~·~ftfa~ afo:;mey theparticultq" field oflaw. 
z4 ! (D) Theprevathng charges 
· • (E) ."vVheth~r 
:;:is (F) The fin:i.e 1imi.tatf/)ns ll.Uposed by .fhe client or the oircnmstan.ces of the case. 
1· 
26 l 











--) LLP Pa!Je 1111 
< 
• I. 
(G) The an.10n11t involw~d aJJd the 
(fl) The ui1d<~si:rabiIJty of the case . 
(I) The natt1re u:ivi length of tbe profost:iott;fl relatfonslrip whh the olicnt. 
(J) A\vards .in siix;;ifa.i: cases, 
•"f.T) ·r1~·,;,·., •·> ;.· ""'l;)t~ i'"jF~. V"- .·.iv lX·Rd,Q,;,.,c .& •.• l,_,, 
Rc:search);. the 
.,,,,·ny' S ,, ,,;.,~~ 
z,·,;.4 L i,..•µ.;)..,_ • ., 
research (Computer .Assist"d Legal 
it was reasonably nece.'>.s<ny in prep,1-ring f1. 
(L) Any other factor v/bfoh the cmni d<:~~:r.rrn itppropxfate in the iimkular rAJ,se. 
6 
· LR.C.P. 54(c)(3). 
7 \ The, Court haB discn:tion to decide what constitntl:\S <t reas1)noble fee and is to be guided by the 
• If •bov• c,ritcria. Sa11dm v. Lankford, JJ4 Idaho )22, J. P.3d 823 (Ct. App. 2000). No one fucto, 
9 lshm:ild be given more weight than the otbers. Electric. W'holesale Supply Co. v. Ni.elson, 136 Idaho l 
: : I 814, 827, 41 P .3<1 242, 25 5 (ZOO I). "RuJe 54( e)(3) does not re~ u;,.,, tlie district ocmt to ma)to I 
specific findingH in the record, only to ctJrJs.hfor the stated factoi·s in determining tho an1ou.11t of the 
foes, When considering the factors, court:> need not dem.0~1sh'ate JJow they employed my of those 
.H 
factors itJ reaching an award au:iouDt." Letttmich v. Letiunich, 145 Idaho 746, 749, 185 P.3d 258j 
15 26l (2008). 
A. ENA 
l7 ENA requests costs and fees in fuc total amm111t of $.394,94L03, consisting of $11,423.60 
18 tin c.ostt: a..c: arnatter of1ight, $22,770.08 in dJ.-;cr::;ti.onary c-0sts and $360,747.35 in altoro.eys' foes. 
•The Court w'f 11 make the fo llo'wing awards: 
1. The Court wm award ENA $1l;423.60 in cost11 as a matter Qf right 
ENA :requests $11/t23.60 in costs as a. matter ofrlght. Thi~~ arnotint reflects ;1 total of 
22 
$258.00 in clerks and service: foes and $11,165.60 in deposltlon costs. Sy:i:ii1g.i.does not nhje:ct 
















2. The Conrt not make an award disc.reti.miary cost~ to ENA 
ENA requests a total of $22, 770,08 b.1 discretionary Gosi~, This <imount reflecls: 
L C:()/DVD copy $10.00 
2. 1vfosseuger $270.00 
3. Tc.lecopy .$174.00 
4. Copies $3,711.12 
$269.38 
6. Expenditures (tnmseript, tra:vd, etc.) $16,1.37.29 
7. W estlaw rnscm:ch $2,039.8:9 
8. Cell phone/Jnsuran<~e $138.40 
TOTAL 
ENA assetts tt1;i.t these oosls Wl!re neccssaxy and reasona:bly incurred M.d that they were 
exceptional "given the magnitude of this cas¢l." (Mcmorandm:11 of Costs and 1\..ttomey Fees at 5.) 
Sycinga obj er.ts to these c.osts generally on the basil> th~1tENA ha~, failed to show that the costs 
we:re nece.ssary and ex.ce.ptional; Instead these costs ~~re routirw expense.~ of litigation. SyriJJga 
· pru:ticula:rl)' objects to the costs assC>cia1e.d with Westluw n~seru;ch beNnt::;e tRC.1). 54(e)(3)(K) 
· speclfi.cally provides for computer assisted legal research upon a proper showing as 1Hi.rt of 8.tl. 
Tho Court has revj.ewed Bx~hibit A attached to the Mar.ch 21, 2011 Affidavit of P1ti.1Hp S. 
n · ()berrccht~ submitted for i'n camera review. E:x:11ibit A is a co.rnputr;r ge.i:ie.ratcd n:po.rt .itemizing all 
of tfoe cost,; ~mct attorney fecis i:nr..urred by ENA in connection with this a.ction. The Court does find i 
·. 1.hat the above costs w~re ncccl:lSaty lllld. r.easona.bJy incurred. However, tht$C costs appear to be 
25 
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'I routine oo'1sand exp ens es o flitigatwn, and th''." O.is oo t . a . • sh.awing faat cu oh 
costs can be cl:wncten.zed. :;tq except1011aL ENA :> conchi.:;;ory statc;n~:nt: tnat tnesc costs are 
2 
3 I e:xci:;ptio.nr·Ll g1v(~tJ the 
4 f C<Jsts, As a pn~nHi11g party, E:N A th~ burden to m1 tlwt such 
: Jcosts are "1<Ceprional md thlrt the award would he in the intarcst ofjustfre. Beco Con,,t. Co., fnc., 
130 Idaho at l L ENA bas 110t met this burden. As au of dis•::;tctinn, the Court \vill. not 
7 
allmv the discre.tion.ary costs cfaim.ed by ENA. 
B 
9 
'.·! rese1u'd1 are rnore iippropri<xt.ely categorized as a foctor in awardiug artorn.eys' fees m1der lR.CP. 
lfj ! 
13 
54(e)(3). TJm Comt \X/111 consider this iHJ. a factor in awr1Hfo1g attomcy;; fo,cd. 
3. T!u~ Con.rt will n.warct :ENA tl)e full amount :h.1 attorneys' fe1~si .reduced. to 
retlect the prevailh:ig nites ir~ Boise, 'hhiJrn 
ENA rcqu<~sts 11tt.orney1::' feet\ puxsnmrt to Idaho C0de § J.2~120(3), as it is the 
HI 





ln any .::;ivil action: to. r;;;,rxi,,,;e.r .on im. open 2e:0ount, account st;;Jedi P.Ptc>i ;?.ill, 
1.1eg· ·o·t;,,,l)lt>:'.lf.l"''l"UT)"E)'1'' gU'tJ"ll'''W (.Tr' COI1fr'>('.f fl'::hi''i>IO' fo 1fi" 'f>ll"''\)Ht>•ci ')"' .,;;lt'· o··f~· .,· , '.J,'C;"1,'.-I,.., - i..,.1, ._.1.,. Q-1\, _ _,_ .,.. ,.I._ .!.J>_i)l- , L _ (,, "1\iJ ;1" ~Jc). "' ,. )..A•,,~ -v . <' .. .l-.. , -~>-p _ ., ~;- ,11."" -~Jr' ll ....... -...>:~ 1,. .,l; • -'"-~'~ ,,- '•' -. 
good$,. war~~s. meiY~frand:if1.e, or $ei:vfoe,'j .~111d in rl!Jy t~tit1)ffletdtf1 t1'1.msactior1 unlt:;10u'J. 
otherwise: pro-vi.d.ed by law,. the ptevaiJing shall b<:1. clllowed a re~t!~•·:i11.iatHe 
att\vJ.'ft.0y•s foe tl,)·besetbytl;ecl.1urt, w bt~ltt~~cdan<l G<:!Hectcd as ¢1:'.'lsts. 
Idaho Code§ 12··120(3). "Tbc tenn 'commercial trunsactiou' is defined to J.nean ill transactions 
.·except tr;'i.nsactions for personal or hDusdmld rnn:pose.s.'' Id. 
"The critil:al fo.\St i11 ()c:,terminl.ng wbd.her <t civil i.wtion is for a comrnexcial transaction is 
. whether th<? conunc.rcial traiJsacticn comprises the ~'nlv::>.men of the Jawsu:it; lt 111u.st be inti'lgra1 to 
23 
24 the claim imd constitute the basis upon which the pirrty is attempting to recover." Jolwnnsen v. 
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752, 864 P.2d 
::; 194 (Ct. App, 1993); see also lvfadmy v. Four Rh1r:;'1~S packing Co., l 45 Idaho 408, 415, 179' P.3d 
l 064, 1017 (2008) (stating thBt "foe 
7 




lD Sy.dnga does not dispu.to that this is 11 c01n1n(;;tcfal trnnsaction~ but argues font ENA i::: not ! 
ll r. entitled to a!.torrF;;ys' fees be.C!lllS~ the T~aming Agre:ocment states t1iat eac~h party woul.d pay its own ! 




4. General Th[;) parties Gau amend this Agreement only by a writteri t·tgrem:nent of 
the parties that kk:ntifies itself as an amendment to tli{s A.greemcnt. Tlrn pai.ties can 
w;.iive this Ae,'I'ee:ment mtly by writjug exe;cuted by tbe party or p~1rties 2gain~t 
whotn the waiver is sought to be enforced .. I1:adt pan:y shaU pay its 0H)1t fees and 
expenSf!S (including withot~t limitation, t!ii~ Jaes w1d e:xpense.~ of its agent.s, 
represr:nt,otives, r1tiorw::y.~ and accountants~ incurred in connection with the 
negotiation, drafting, execution, <ldive:ry, and perfi>1'1nance O.f this Agreement and 
the transactions it conlen~plates. 
.17 l' 
1 s I (Teruning Agree111e1n.t at § 4) (emphasis added), 1 
l!l 11:1r, above quoted langi.1ag0 do~~ not apply. The fees ENA Jnrn1:i.\;:.d in dcfondin,g this action 
20 
were not "in com1ectio11 with. the negcti.ation, draftiDgj execution, delive-ry, ;md performancr,l1 of 
!:he Temning Agreeme:n.t Instead, the :foes were i11Gurnxl in dofo11ding against this action in whkh 
<12 
23 l 
1 A copy of the Temning Agreern.e11t is utt.achr::d as E;<l.unit I to lJ.ic NoVl!.rube,r 23, 2010 Afl'idayft of Leslie: M. 
;l.$ . Hayes it\ Support ofHNA Services LI.CS t-fotion fot Sunm1<1ry Jud~,Tni::nt 
MEMOR.A.:NDlJ1\1 DECISION AND o~:rmn. RE: COSTS A.l'l'D ATT0RN.N1'S' FK!:$ --)'AGE 9 l 
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12/22/11 l3 :21:4B 1 l J.IJCHS UP 
'I 
[1 
l i jl 
!( L 
l 
ENA's Teiilllillg A1Jteement partc1cr sned \lN A when the Sl•te did not n1oke the awerd th> t Sy>i nga 1 
2 J hoped for. 
3 ! The Court will flncl llmt the underlying actiQ!l agal.nst ENA fa an actiou to recover in a 
4 \! con1u1ercir.tI trmJsaction m1.d tl1;:Jt JJNA. is t:Htitkd to an <.l.W::>rd <Jf feos pu.r~mant to Idaho Code§ 12~ 
5 120(3). 
7 t 
f foes inctttr~.d by its foc;;1! cou..nsr::I ;~nd the fo:e~; hi.cunt::d. by its non.11HI cmmsel from Nashville, 
s I 
f Tcnnesse0. The totttl 1Hncinnt inni.trcd for ENN6 local counsel i:u1d p~iralegal se.rvice::; j~j 
91 
· $176~613.00. for lhe work of Phillip S. Oborrcoht, a shareholder in foe Boisi:.: firm Hall, f<'\wley, 
lO 
11 · Oberrecht & J31anto11,. P.A. with a!xrut thhiy·follf (34) yca1'S experience who expcudcd 364 bour8 at 
12 I the rate of $250.00 p~~r horn:; Leslie M. lfay(~8, an ansodat~ attomey in tb.0 same fim:t with about 
13 thre.e and a half (3.5) years experience vvho 0xpended 399.80 hours at the rate of $165.00 p~~r hour; 
14
· I and Julie A. Shipley, a paralegal who expended 189.40 billable hours at $l00.00 per hour. Syringa 
15 t 
objects to these amounts, m:guiitg that ENA has not provided suffident in.formation for the Court to 
consider in light of tho Rule 54(Q)(3) factor.~. 
17 
HI 
Il1e Court has J:evkwod the partiE:s' ro·gtiments1 affidavits and attached exhibits, specific.ally 
Exhibit A to the March 21, 201 l Oberrcoht Affidavit, and fa satisfied that ENA has provided 
20 su£fi.cient infor.r:nation for the Cmui. to detennine the amount of ::tttnrneys' fees in light of the Rule 
54(e){3) fi1Cton~. Fmther, the Contt has considered al1 of the factor,'< 11et forth above arid wil1 firid 
23 
2 4 .~· WbilrJ par:tle:gnl s:ervfods;. sccret1vfol in n1rli.m\ <ll'C .~mtt\l(:vv01i1hl~, as <\tt1)r1sey's ftel.l 1.1~ ,g:,, !:forns v, Hltlt.S~ 129 / Jd:iJ10 &<!7, 934 P.2d 2(t.(l 997), m.!l;:ll><mi:yht 1e~'~wertlbie if:thl:\ pnr1J~\1~n.t1"J?rtbnue,d ti.i:iks tliat nthtrwLtJ;c wdl11Ll 
f iJ~\1e be::i';~i:l petfonued by:r~J1ttt~mey, Jn,~;? (Jniw:~slf)i Pfa.cl!![d,itm Water C~1i@' F'•:oJi::ct,;MG ~d.•-iho 527, 1451 f99 
.?.5 1 P.3d: l{l2, 120 (Z00ll}. Syni+gn 1ins :Gotcl1¥1foll.$Cd t1e';1sw1nJ •)fparafog?J..fees·c~! tfos bttsi.s .. 
26 
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/ lj ii 
ktl:iat ENA's regt:1e$t .for the fues ofits local counsc~l is reasonable. The Court wiH award tht::' foll 
1 l 
2 
arnon:ti.t of nttomeys• fees n:questf' . .d by ENA with respect to the work perfotmed by ENA' ;1 lot~!il 
3 j counsel, $176;<513,00. 
4 I , ~NA also . attorneys' fees in the3mm.tct CJf $184,134,~5 for ,workperfonned by 
:J j( ENA s '1 onnessee eoi.msel Robt!rt S. Patterson, Bratlky Arant Bou1t Cun1n1.ing,;;, LLP, and 
fi .f C!J:ristimdsbell, a pm.ale gal at the finn. Mr, l?nttctsCln hilletl nt a .rnte of$435 per. h()ur for work 
7 
/ petfonncd in 2010 and $445 per hom· ~or ·work porfonned in 2011. Ms. fabe11 hilled at a rat~ of 
8 l 
f · $180 for work perftmned in 2010 and $1B5 for work perforrned fo 2011. The Court ba.s rcvkwed 
10 
the March 2 l~ 2011 Affidavit of Robert S, I1 Clttc..'r~on aJ1d the atlal~hed exhibits and is satisfied that it 
contains sufficit:rit 1nJmmatlon tD allow the Court to dctenni.ne the arrwunt of fo1;;s in light of tho 
12 . · RL1Ie 54(e)(3) fi:tGtors. 
L:l I . Fm.ihe.r, the Court h::is considered t110~.c) factors set forth above and fi:ndl'l th\lt the nmount 
l '1 · and typei of work pe:rfom1ed byJVfr. Patterson m.1d Ms. lslJeU <tre reasonable. }fowever, the Court 
will find. that the hourly rates charged by Mr. Pati0rson and Ms. fabe11 are signifo)antly higher than 
16 
the Joeal prevailLng rates. s,w Lettunich v. Lett1.mich 1 141Idaho425, 435, ll1P.3d110, 120 (2005) 
17 
1a 
(stating that "[i]u detottiJfoing the reiosonabfoner:.s of an hourly rate . , . the court r;hould consickr 
19 the fee ra:tes gent~:rallyprevailing in the pertinent geoi;7aphic area ... .''). The Court will ma1i::e a full 
award for tbe n1.t1nber of hours >vorJrnd by the Bradley Antnt Bo ult Ctimrn1ngs, LLP will re<lnce foe 
• amon.nt of attorneyst foes fur the \Votk of l'vfr. Pi1tt(~rson and Ms. :s'bell to reflect the prevailing 
22 l .houdy .rates in .Boise:, Xd11hc. Tht> Court will reduce lli, .Patterson's rate to$ 250.00 pet hour and 
23 \ will reducr; Ms, lSbell's ratl:l to $100.00 per hour. 
25 
26 
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I L.astly, tho Court bas considered the n;quest for autom.ated legal research foes pursuant to 
- 1 j lR.C.P. S4(e)(3)(K). The Cotut is familim· with tlH:i kgul research. done in fu1,s case and will find 
2 h 
:i 1 lfott .ENA's nxtuest for \VestLaw C'·hRrges in the mtl.o\mt of $21039.89 is reasonable ar.1d ·will award 
n. Qwest 




I Qwest seeks a total of$.588,S63.44, made U}) c>f $11.,787.21 in costs as a matter ofrightt1nd I 
( '$577,07 6.23 it1 attorneys' fee:;. Qwe$t do~s uot seek disetetfonary costs. The Court wm n.iake the I. 
IJ 1 l 
I foUowir1g· awsnts: .51 
1 ~: ! 
1. The Court \'>'ill award Qwest $H! 787.21 in costs aa a matte:r of right 
Qwest seeks $11 1787.21 in costs :ls a i.m1tter of right, pursuant to I.R.C .. P. 54(d)(1)(C)(9). 
This arnouut reflects costs incurred in coJ1r1ection with repo1.ting imd trm1saibit1g mu11erous 
13 dept)sitiolls. Syrfoga does not dispute that Qwest is thG i;>:revailing party a11d does not clisptHe thei,e 
C0$1:s. The Court wm a1-vard tho foll iiUJO\Ult requested by Qwest for costs a.'ii a matter of right 
15 
16 
Qwest seeks att()meys' tees punma11.t to Idaho Code§ 11··120(3), as the prevai1h1g p::n:ty i.n 
.an action to re-<cove1· in a OODlllJ.oroia1 tnm.saction, llILd Idaho Code § 12-121, 011 the bt1si.s tb;i.t 
19 Syr1nga's lawsuit agait1st Qwest was frivolous. 
?,O a. ldabo Code§ 1.2-120(3) 
;n Qwest seeks attom~ys' fees r>nrstumt to Idaho Code § 12··120(3), :rrgning it is tlrn prevailing 
n . party in an aclfon to recover in a oortm:i.crdal tr:n.nsaction. Sydnga o~jects; esse.ntin.lly m-gi.ting that 
23 
although a commercial tra:usactio11 w~rn i~nvolved .in this case, the Tearning Agreement was benvt~~m 
21! 
'Syringa and. ENA, .not Syrlnga aJ1d QweHt. In their reply> Q\vest daeri not dispute tlrnt tlic 
26 l 
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cttnm1erd.~1l h:anst1dio.n mnsl be l:;ctwccn the parties, hut instead c.ont(~nds that the "conunerclal 
tnnwaciio1J" hem i~; the Idaho Ed11eation Nct1.vork ("JEN") procuretMnt, a 11J1tlti··pany GOllJl.ni~rciaJ 
'1rai1sa.(;tiOtl in which the parties were equally involved. 
As stu.ted in section A ;foove, "[t]hi;; critical test J;u detei:rnfofog whether a civil action. is for 
a com111ercial t:mns.w::6011 is whether the c;,ornnrnrcial trm1sactlo11 comprises the gnwan:ien of the 
lawsuit; it rxmst be h1Jcgral to the claim '1nd constitute the b3Sis upon which the party is aHempting 
\to recover.)j Johannsrm v. Utterbt~i:k, J.46 Idaho 423, 432, 196 P . .3cl. 34l, 350 (200S). "Idaho Code§ 
12· 120(3) does not require that the-re be a contract between the J)ffities before the statute is l:lpjJ lie.cl; r j 
tho st~J.tute only rcqniI'($ that there be a com1nucfo.1 traJJ;:;action." Itt re University Place/Idaho 
Water Center Project, 146 JdfilJo 527; 541, 1.99 P.3d 1.02, t l6 (2008). However, the aclfr>D n:rnst 
· flrise fanu n commercial transaction between the parties, BECO Constr. Co., Inc. v. J-U~JJ E'ttg'rs, 
· Inc., 145 ldaho 719> 726, J 84 P3d 844, 351. (2008). 
'I'.bl;) Comt agrc.e,~ with Qwest. 'fhis fawsuit arosi; out of the St,1tc's dual award to Qwest and 
ENA, which had partrn~red wi1.h Syringa under the Teaming Ap7eeine.nt, <l.n<l Ulen the State's 
• fast1si1ce ofidenticaJ. statewide bfauket purchase orders to Qwest and ENA. As (~:vest poinLo; ot1t, 
the XEN procurcnwnt cuntempla.ted nutneraus cornm.ercial transactions bctwee11 Sy:dnga and 
Qwest, even thougb the din~ct prime conln1ct wonld be between Qwest and iho State iJndJor ENA 
and t.be State. The Teamitig Agreement was but one aspect oftl:us larger cortnnercial tnmsaction. 
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Qwest also seeks attorney:/ fees pm·suilXJ1 to Idaho Code§ 12-121. Attl'.HTli:lY foes tmder this 
I provision fa not a matter of rightci and nwy only IJe a-warded "wben the Co1.it1, in ftt; discretion, 'is 
: I J oft witl1 tl1e abiding beliefU<at tl10 acli 011 wa< pursue.<!, d efo>\de-0, '" bm ugh! Mvolo1"l y, 
5 I bl ··· · h "'· ·d··' · ''l .,, ",,. · "d' l ·. JJ' rv 1 1~· l ('. 1~5 :l Uhn~asona y, or Wtt out mun at.Icm. · 1va111p1~ co1. ))1tir1 .. um rng . . lSL v. l1'ast<. 1 ec. ,,iav., .;} 
1$ l 
. Idaho 518, 524-25 (2001) (qnoti:ng Owne1'·0pera!or Ind. Drivers Assac. v. Jrlaho P1lblfo Util. 






l In light of tho Court's decision to award attorrH~ys' frees pur:mm1t to JdaJw Code§ 12-
. · 120(3), The Court will -cot addn:::ss whether attorn0ys' fees sJ1ould bo awarded t'mdr~.r this tif;c.tion. 
3. The Court wm awarrd Qvrcst the fun m.nou.nt in i~ttorneys' fees, tednced to 
refli'!<:t th!! prevailing n1tes in Boise, Muho 
Hn:ving concluded. that Qwest is the ptevailing party in an acr.iou to rccov~r in a commercial 
j tran::rncticm, the Cou1t will grflut ilttl)rney foes 10 Qwest The issue thus becomes the arnounl of 
15 .· . .reasonablo attoniey foes to which Qwest is entitled. Qwest seeks a total of$577,076.23 in 
16 attor110yEJ' fees. This amount reflects $63,225.17 incurred for tho work of Qwe»st' s ]i)c:aJ. co11usel a.t 
17 Moffatt, Thomas~ Barrett, Rol~k & Fields, Chtd. a11d $513,321.73 i:n.curred for the work i;,fQwest's 
:UJ Denver counsel at Horn.e Roberts & Owen, LLP. 
Ul Steven R. T11Qtnas, a partner at Moffo.i:t1 Thomas, Handt, Rock & Fields, Cht<l.was the 
20 
. pri.u1azy attm:ney froin Boise who c:harged at the rnte of $26.5.00 p~r hour. Otlier pat1:ucrs charged 
21 
• $265.00 per hour. Paralegal assistants ~harged at the rate of $1 l5.00 per hour. 
22 
23 I 
Stcn~n J. Pcrfremcnt is the primary attorney from Hahne Roberts & Owen, LLP and is a 
2 -) .. pitrtner there. Mr. Perfrerncut charged Qwest an hourly rate of$315 per lumr. Kathy M. Taylor was 












· In additimlo work was billed by: B, .Lawrence Theis, a partn(;;r at the ffrni ('77.S br.rurn x $400.00); 
2 •. {Meredith A. fohoPJton. an associate aLtorncy (187.9 hot\tS x $240.00); Jc:;sica D. Tsuda, H11 
, l. "."ociato •ltomey (78. t hour".:' $.220.00); li!n•rim1 l<..eUy F~111ing :2.S. hou" x [~~.no"°' rate.D: 
Ii ht1ga~,10n support t~peernhsts Snsn B1orkqmst (9.8 hours x $200.00), Hill Pt.yne C::b. ! hourn x 
5 
· $175.00), Kathlesn W~ncr (30.5 .bour x $200,00) :md Hrym1 Briggs (1.1 hu1~~s :x :5200.00). 
Sy:rfoga argLies, as it did with ENA, tkt Qwcs~ h~L~ faiJcd to present .sufficiei:tt evidence for 




The Court has n:vii:::wcd tlrn parties' arg1,11nents, ailid;witi and attached e:x.h1'hits and is 
11 . satl.sfi~d that Qwest has prov1ded sufficient infornmtion for 1he Court to n:iak:e its dF:,tennimiiion, 
12 l~1uth<:r, fuc Court hu.< comiderod the Rule 54( e)(J) factors. lo 1 ight of (hose factors, the Court will I 
13 • find that tht~ am.oni1trcqt1estcd for Qwest's local coi.:mscl is reasonable. Additimrnlly, th~ Contt w:111 
14 
.find that the arnotmt and the work p(:;rforrned by Qwcst'1J Denver cmmsel was re.asotrnhle. 
However, tb.c Court wi.11 find that the hm1rly ri:'ltes charged is si.gnific<mUy higher than th13 
16 
. prevailing rnteB for: Hke s~.;rvices in view of t1)e local preva11ing rates. s~e Le.ttr.miclt V, Lett1mlch, 
.141Idaho425, 435, 11J.P.3d110, 120 (2005) (~tatJng that "[i]n deternfr11ing therea.c;o:nable1rnss <)f 
18 
19 ·an hourly rat" ... the court 51:101110. consi.der the fee r~11es genera.Uy prevaili:ng iu the pt'.\Jtinent 
20 geographic area .... "). The Cou1:t will rcdi1ce the r.1m.onnt of 11tt•~meys' foes for the work of 
n 
1 
Qwest' s Denver counsel to nd'lect the preval'ling hourly rates in Boise, Icl2J10. J11e Court wnl 
22 
.·reduce the ratt":S charged a.s foUows: n1te for pmtne:rs: $265.00 i:w-;r hour; rate for associate 
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111 
/1 C. State J. ' 
2 
( The St<tte Ikfondants request $9,904.65 ln(~ost.s as a n:rnHer of right> $27,248.34 in 
31'1 discre!iouBry costs and $ 34 8, 05 2. S& itt ottomeys' feeo P"''" ant to Jdoho Code § § 120(3) and 
4 '12wJ21, totaling $385;205.87. tn addition, the Defond;;n1s .have Ji.led two rtJQffomi for Jt;avc to 
I . 5 I a.mend theirme:morandum of costs aml foes to include n!que,:'lts u:r:11for ldnho Code§§ 6~918A, 12-
r-., I 117 and 10-1210. 
I I L 
'fhe State Dcfendimts requr:;st foavt;i to f.ttwnd their me;:i:norandmn of costs md fo~~s to add 
9 
10 
Idaho Co(le §§ 6-9L8A and 12~117 mi additional authority for the award <)f attomcys' 1}ics and l I 
11 Idaho Code § 10-12 l 0 as an additional basi:> for tl1c a.ward of costs. Syringa obj1o>cts, arguii1g that a 
12 :n1otion to enlarge time under I.R.C.P. 6(b) and I.R.C.l). 54(d)(5) reqnires ''gMd cause shown" ai1d 
13 the State Defendants lui.v~ failed to .show go{)d cause for :oot identii)'ing all of fue bases for 
14 
·. recovery in its odginal monwrandum of costs 1u1d fof~s. The State Defendants argu.e that its motion 
15 is .not a motion to enlarge time btonglit undr:;r LR.C.P. 6(b) a:ud I.R.C.P. 54{d) because it did timely 
.··file its memorandum ()f costs. 1nstead, the State Defond.ants request that the Court treat its nwtions 
l') 
. to amend likr:. a Rnle 15 (~.) Jnotion to aUJend a CD111plaint wheJ.l justice so rec1u.ire£i, ;md there is no 
showing of bad faith, rn;1due delay, dilatoiy conduct and no n1sulting prejudke to the nCltH11ovin.g 
?.O ! 
The decision ta arne1l.d a memcr.1:ru1duni of cost and fees fa conxinitted to the disc.retion of the I 21 
22 
•. trial C01.lrt and will not be distm:be-0 absent a showing of clerit en:or. Ada Counry f-{wy. Dist. v. 
23 IAcarnqui~ 105 Idaho 873i 673P.2d1067 (1983). HA coort may, in its diseretion, allow such 
24. 
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I! q 
I! 
1 ·· Syritlga has folly an1l '''"''V"' the additfo:nal lmsc9 of n~.covery and 
t l indication that it wouJ.d 1Jf: deprived 
2 
suhshtn.tial right ~m of the Court I 
5 } will allow the to rnnenrl ,_ ..... u.cuLl of cos.t;:; to ndd Idnho CodM t 






10 .. 1 
The 01u1·t yviU 
right 
the Oofc;idun!.• $9,904.65 in cos"' us a •hatter o( I 
7 I 
s r 54('.:i)(l)(C). This ~~ll01mt reflects a $58.00 filinri_, :nd $9,~04.65 for deposition tianacr:ipts. 
9 f Synnga does not d1sp11te I.Le an101111t requeste[L I he L\JUrt w11l awai:d the foll amount as requested 
The Stite D1;>,femlants request $9,904. 65 .h1 costs as a matter of right pu:i:smmt to LRC.P. 
by the' SHtte 
11 
3. The Ct)tfft will nnt a·war(f discretionary co5f.S to the State IJefrnd.ants 
12 
. Additionally, the State Defendants request $Z 7 ,248 .34 io di,SC:.tdfonary 1.X)Sti:i p1rrs11ruJ:t to 
13 I 
u t I.R.C,P. 54(d)(l.)(0) ~md Tdal10 Cocl.e § 10~ UlO, Thig amom1t reflects the following: 
15 J .. l 1. Post.age an.d shipping charges $198.% 





4. Cornpuc~:r assi.sted :research charges 
.5. ASCENSIO document prtA~essing chtttgt~s $5.581.86 





&. Fees paid K. Redlich tOr hearing trnnscripts $537.50 
9. Courthouse parking foes $13.00 
25 10. Expenses forbi11dars and tabs docun:i.cnts $1,979.SS 
2.6 
·'.M:EMORANJ:)tJM nr~crsrm~ AKD 01m:KRRE~ COSTS MD ATTORNEYS' :FJCE$-f'AGE 17 
I 
j 
12/ZZ/ll 13: 27; lfo.u le!) 11 GiiJens ly LLP Pa.m~ 823 
I h 
l. !l $6,81.3.53 
Tlw State Dcfoi1dants do not (JXpluin in thefr mctnoniodum in t:1.11;po:rt of reqyest for COGts t 
5 I the interest of justice. Syringa thrw objects to these costs nrgni11g th<Jt. tbc State Defendants h;1vc not · 
6 
• I shown the costs to be exce.ptional and insteadi the (;o.sts are !)rdinmy expenses of m1y lawsuit. The 
7 
State Defendants reply that the~e oxceptfonal cos:l$ \V6rc h:i.curred as a r:csult of Syrhlga's 
"aggressive litigation tµclics and jnHilltcnc.e upon i;:xknsiV() discovery which amo1.1.ntcd to notbin.g 
9 
more than an mmxorluctive fishing extJedition. , .. i; (State; Defend1mttl' Reply at 18.) In additiou7 10 I . 
1
.• the State Defondants argue that in declaratory judgments such as thi3, "the court may make su.ch Jl I 
12 aw1trd ofcosts aJS may seem equitable and just." ld~tl.,a Code§ 10-1210, 
1.3 Undm: LR.C.P 54(d)(l)(!J), clisCJ:f;tionary cor;t1s G:i.ay he awarded. to the prevailing p1uty 
when the costs are necesMtry and reaso11ably i11c:um1d, w.hero the natu:rc of the c;;~so is itself 
exceptional a.ad thl'I costs are assessahle against tbo adverse p<:rty in. tl)e interel:;t of justice. See 
. Hayd1;vi Loke Fire Protection Dist. v. Alcom, 141 ldaho JO'/, 314i 1O'./'P.3d161, 168 (2005). Tht\ 
Court has reviewed the <Jiu.davit of ~1er1yn CJar:k, and. attached exhibits, detailing the JJf:l.ture oft.he 
. c;osts tnt'utT<;d and does find th<,1t tbese co~:ts wetc~ n.eDesSat:V a.rid reasonably incurred by the State 
:l SI • " 
20 ·· .Deten.dants. However, the State D~fonrfants have not made a sufficient showing th2.t these costs 
21 were exceptional. h a prevmJi.ng patty, tho State Defotl.clants have the initial hurd.;n to m.ake an 
I 
22 ) adeq1.1ate showing that su.ch coi;ts \Vern necessary and exceptional, reasonably incurred ~nd the 
23 
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of disorctitmary costs ta the State Defondanft'; pun:uant to LR.CF 54(d)(l )(D). 
Counts Two Tlm~e r)fthc: Vl';;riiicd Complaint sought ;J, dcdfl.r;itoryj11dgmeut that foe 
4 I .av,rnrds to Qwe::<t and Ul\A were in viol<Uion of stat~.> hw and shonl.d be voJd<::d, Ida:.~a Coch: § 10-
1210 pttivides a;.1 alteniate grnu11d f<')t awrn:ding C:Df;tS fu an acti.on for dedatatory'reJief. The cotirt 
6 I can make an aW<il'd of co.;its urmn a finding tliat ;.Ht award v.'•~1~ ''equitable and just". Idaho Code§ 
l 
I 
l . " 
·i t l 0·· 1210. The Suptetne Conrt affin:ned a trial c;ourt' s fnvard of co1c:ts pursuant to this statute in In re ! 
~ . Ufrf.w.rrst~y Placc/Jdaho Water Ccnfar Proje(:t1 146 'Idaho 527, 199 P .3d 102 (2008) wb.r:.'.!'e the ttfal I' 
court dC\termined that tho non-prevaili11g party cho.se to pu:n.me "novd" thecnicri to avoid liability. l 
f 
11 ld. a.t 545-46. 1n this case, th<~ Comt does llOt ch11racte,1iz;c Syring-a.' s declaratory judgment claims · 
12 · JtS "novol". The State awarded ther.e c.ontractr1 in Sltch a way as to t1xotLtde Syringa entirely :IS:orn. 
13 pa:rtidpating in. the work. As an exerf,fae (Jf discretion, tl;e Court will declim; to mah au award of 
.costs pursu.ant to Tdahi'.l Code§ 10-1210. 
categodzrnl as a faL:tor i;n awarding r~ttorney fees lu1<l.er LR.C.P. 54(e)(3). The Court will consider 
11 
. the automated legal research as a factor to be considered as p£trt of the .request tbr attorney fees. 
lil 
19 
4. AttMMys' Fe,~s under ltfah!} Code§§ H~H0(3), 12~121, 12-117, 6-918A 
20 The State Dcfond::mts req11est $385,205.87 in attorneys' foes pursnaot to IdabO Code§§ 12~ 
21 .120(3) rm<l 12··121. Sy:rhJ.ga objects, arguing tJ1at 1..n.1der Pot!atr.h Educ. Assoc, v. Potlatch School 
I 
22 Dist. No. 285, 148 Jchlho 630, 226 P.3d 1277 (2010), Idaho Code§ 12~117 is the exclusive Sl'ltute ! 
'· 
n I l under which a state entity may seek atton1.cys' fees. The State Defendants essentially rep1y that 
24 












Idaho Code !i 12-120(3) provides for attorneys' fceH to tlw prevJi11ng pi~rty iu1 amo11g otbcr 
2 / tirings, an action to recover on a co11tr:wt related to the p1rr,chase or sale of gt>O(Ui, wares 
_, I or or an action t.»:ecoverin a § I 
'jl 1•)Q(3) ~['f' i"t.•t> l<,- '' ••t· "• ''' ' '( ,n'•{i , . .,>,; ' '··~·' ·' ,,; J: l 4 l ~· .. 1e:,; .~,\.1. w pdJ cy '' 11k<lll pc rs JU, l"'' 1,CL,,1ip, 1.,lJyt,Q1<lcWn, 11~t-,<,La(10H, f 
5 
1 pdvate orgnniz<1tion, 1he state ofJd~lhn or poli:ical subdivfaiou thereot "Id. 'l'J1us, under tlic plam 
6 
I Jangu a/!/; of the statute it would appear that tho State D efenda11ts m::iy sc~* 2.ttorneys' foes pLW>l~rnu.t 7 , to Idaho Code§§ 1Z~120(3) andior 12·121. 
Scvcntl Idaho Supreme Court cases, how,over; state lfo1t Idaho Code § 12 l Pis the 
9 ' ,• 
· ex.elusive means .frJr awarding attorney fees fbt Ht2te agencier:;. E.g. Potlatch, 148 ld.a'hu <it 635: 
l.O 
11 Westway Const., Inc., v. Idaho 1ransp. Dep't, 139 Ichlho 107, 116, 73 P.3d ?2J, 730 (2-003); State 
12 v. Hagerm.an Jfi.iter Right Owners, 1hc., 130 Idaho 71S, 723, 947 P.2d .391, 396 (l997). Jn 
13 Potlatch, the court denied a scbOi:ll distrii;;t's regn~st :fi:ir atl•::irnoys' foes aga.infJt ;:i scboDl district 
" I brought p\ltGIUml to !daho Code§ l2-l2l. Id Similarly, the court in SmUh v. Washinglo11 Cawd)• 
15 
. Idaho, 150 Jdaho 388,,, • .,, 247 Y.3d 615, 619 (2010) followe,i:l Potlatch and cleuied atl.individual's 
.request fnt fees -punma.nt to Jd..aho CodtS R § 12-120(3) aml 12~ 12 l agait1st 11 cow1t)', See also Brown 
l? 
HI l v. City of Poc1itello, 14·8 ldn'"'lio 802, 811~12, 229 P.3cl 1164, 1173"74 (2010) (restatingPotl.atdi's 
.ho 1diug 01at ldalw Code § 12-l l 7 is tl1c cxc.lm:ive rr10<ms for i.~wa.rding. attorney foes for the entltie,} 
19 
2o ·to which it appUes). 
( 
21 ' . Despito its i;,onch1s:km that t1iis c113c is rooted iu a comn1orcird !ra.nsaction .. the Conit is 
22 constrained to foltow the Supreme CourL's decisions in tbe above casc\s and will dc-.clir1e to consider 
23 
· a request for attorneys' feos purmrnnno Idaho Cod.c §§ 12-120(3) or 12~121. ld.ah.o C(lde § 12~l17 
is the exclusive means for awarding attorney foes for state ugt;nciea. 
25 






















(2) If a party to ?st, ,,.J,.,U,,U 
prevail"; on a portion of the 
or tl10 
wi.thout a 
(4) For file of section: 
(a) ",Pt:rnon" shcl.1 mean 




(b} "PoHtica1 subdivision'' shall mean a 
district. 
1daho Code§ 12~1 Under this 
25 ·of foes if the Court fmd~j !.hat the acted 
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. ! fact or law. Based upon review of tjJJ: J 
2 ti without a reasonable b~i.sJs in fil.ct or law. De~:pite the f;wt Hwt all of its ol.a]rns r.1g:<ili1st the State 
record, tho C<.iurt cannot find t:hat Syringa acted 
j ' Defendru1ts were~ 115 the tJf s1mnnary that, in not mean 
1 that the cfailns 'Ncre of :mimu;;; on the plttt 
5 uf an imporUmt state actor. 
6 The State Defondants i:ilsrJ request atlorr1ey;s' foes purs0ant to l<lsho Code § 6-9 l 8A, 
'7 
arguing that Syd;1Jg~i 's d1tb:ns agahwt the State Dcfr:mdµnts were frivolous, u11tef1S(JJ.1ab!o and 
8 
9 
· brong:l:i.t in bad faith. Syring:1. o ~i eds, firguing thnt while ldaho Cod0 § 12,. J 17 i.s tli~: exc hrniv(: bas fa j . 
. J' 
10 
upon which a state 11gew,;y can daim atl\JUWY foes, Idaho Cork§ d·91SA is the exclusive basi!l 
12 . aga:inst the.rn. Syringa atgt1.es that the State Defendants 111tVe not segregated tbeir fees request :in that 
13 • mmmer. Additk1nally, Sytinga atgues that ibc State Defendai1ts have failed to show by de~r and 
\. 4 convincing ~viden.ce that Syrlnga brought its tort clafrn Jn bad faith. fo their reply, the State 
15 




ldaho Code § 6-91 SA provides for tlttorneyL:' fees in a to1i actio11 ~ig;ttin'>t n g.ovenimental 
18 
entity or its employees when there is clear and convincing evidence tliat the part:y agairtst 'vhom 
20 fees ~c song1it "was guilty of had faith in the L',01mnencement, ~ondnct, rnab1tenance or defense of 
41 
22 
•. Frew·Mnt C:mmty, 145 Jdaho 6561 661, 182 l?.3d 713, "/18 (Ct. App. 2008) (dtlng Cordova v, 
: : 1. Bon"."ville Caimly Joint Sch. ~isl. Nu: 93, 144 ldalJn 63 7, 643, 1.67 P. ~ d 77 4, 780. (2007)) .. ~: 
deciston to award fees under th:ts prov1s.1.0111,e eomrmtled to th<:> d1scn~t1on of the !rial court Joano 
25 
26 






11 [~ i uens Pur~;e l y 
l [-
. Code§ 6 .. 918A. Court \V.i.Il have not shown that Syringa acted 
l 
I without a reason.able basis law or 
2: '! ! ! 
acttd bad faiiJ1. As a11 (JXerds;~ of its 
3 I I<lis~~retiot11 the Court will declir10 to r1w<.ml 




As explained above, the Court 
(1) As to 
-Award ENA $11A23.60 cosL~ as a mallet 
~Decline to awaxd ENA discn~t:io-cary coi:its; 
-Award HNA attorneys fees the amount of $1.76,613 .00 for the wodc 
dQ1~c by local cmu1S(:l, Fm:ky, Oben:echt & Blantor, P.A.; 
-Award ENA nttorncys' fe£.s as 1eq11este.d ftrr the legHl work done by out of stn:te 
rates for hi. Boise, Idaho. 
-Award ENA automated legal .rcsearc.h foes the am1:iunt of $2,039.89 to be 
inc1t1ded aa 
(2) Ai::. to Qwest; 
~Award Qwest 11 178 'J. 21 1n costs as a n:1atter of rl~~ht; 
~Awanl Qwest attorneys in the a.mount of $63,225.l 7 the Jegal work 
dom~ hyloc~l cmmsel, Moffatt, Thomas? B:irrett, Rock & Fields, Chtd,; 
~Award Qwest attom.ey fees as rcqtwsted. for tl1e legal work done by ou.t of state 
cou:nselj Holme R.o bcrt:; & Owen, as reduced to reflect prevailing rates for fees 
in noise, ldaho, 
t JV.t:EMO'.R.4.NDUM lJF.OSl()N AND OlUlER RJL; costs AND ATTORtll.~l;ys· FEES •• p P,.G.E w 
I 
































.IT ISSO ortt>ER}SD .. 
Dat('d this _!,l"'"' <lay cf.August ~OlL 
Ii 1· 
·t,··~-' 
'""" H. Owen 
Distrlcqudge 
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OCT 2 7 2011 
CHR!STOFHCH D. H!CH, Clorl~ 
Hy !NGA dOHNSON 
or;rurv 
IN TJJE DJSTRXCT COUR'f OF THE fOtJRTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
SYR INGA NETWORKS, LLC, AN Idaho 
limited linbility company, 
vs. 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF 
ADMINISTRATION; J. MICHAEL HJ'vtJKE" 
GWARTNEY, in his personal and official , 
c~pacity as Dirc:etor and Chief f nfonmitiM 
Officer of the Idaho Dept1.rtment of 
Administration; JACKO. "OREG" ZICK.AU; 
in his personr.i.l official c.apacity of Chief 
Technology Officer iUld Adminfotrntor of the 
Office of the CIO; ENA SERVICES; LLC, a 
Division ofEDUCAT IONNBTWORKS OF 
AMERICA, INC. a Delaware eorpoi:ution; 
QWEST COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY, 
LLC .• a Delaware limited liability company, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0923757 
JUDGMIDNT RE: COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Based upon this Court's Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Costs and Attorney Fees, 
entered on August 4, 2011, and good cause appearing: 
IT IS H.KREBY 0ROERJ!:1), ADJUUGJ;:n ANU DECRE.ED that judgment is entered 
in Javor of defon,ifmt ENA and State defendants and against Plaintiff us follows: 
JUDGMENT RE: COSTS AND A HORNEY FEES • I 
12/22/11 13:31:01 288-338-1388 -) lfouley Troxell Givens Purscly LLP Paye 832 
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H<morah!c; Patrick J .. Ow<~n 
mstrlbt .Jud.go 
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Boise, JD 83701-0829 
.Fax.: (208) 3g5,.53g4 
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Stevt!':n f'erfretncn1 
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1700 Lincoln Street, Suite 4100 
DenY(>f~ CO 80203 
Fax: (303) 866-0200 
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Leslie M. Tfaye.s 
Hall, Farley~ Obenccht & Blanton, PA 
PO Box 1271 
Boise, Idaho 83701~1271 
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B. Lawrence Theis 
Steven J. Perih.~.mcnt (Pro Vice) 
HOLME ROBERTS Owrc:N LLP 
1700 Lincoln Street, Suite 4100 
Denver, Colorndo 
Tek~phone (303) ~\i')1 .. 7000 
Facsimile (303) 866-0200 
!any. theis@hro.com 
sreven.perjreme11t@}hro.com 
Attorney::; J()r Defondant: Qwc~:t 
CommuIJkations Company, LLC 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTIUCT 
OF THE STATE OF JD AHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
SYRINGA NETWOJ.U(S1 LLC, an Idaho limited 
liahility 1.\ompany, 
Pl!liotifJ~ 
Case No.CV OC 0923 75 7 
DEC 15 2011 
V:i. AMENDE.D JUDGMENT RE: 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT Of A.DMINISTRATJON; 
J. MICHAEL f'MIKH" GWARTI~EY, in hiti personal 
and official capacity as Director nnd Chief ·· 
Information Officer of th~~ Idaho Departrnenl of 
A<lmioistration; JACK CL "GREG'' ZICKAU, in his 
personal and ortidal cap:.u~lty as Chief Technology 
Officer and Administrator of the Office of the Cl(); 
ENA SERVfCES1 LLC, a Division of EDUCATION 
NETWOHKS OF AMJ2RlCA, Inc ... it Deluwme 
corporation; QWEST COM1VfUNf CATlONS 
COMP ANY, LLC, a Delaware lirt1itcd liability 
' ' . 
company, 
Oe.fondants. 
COSTS AND ATl'ORNF~V FEES 
AM,J<:NJ>EO Jl)DGMENT 
/11S7lm vi. .kn 
COSTS ANO Al'TOIL~ffl{ FEES ~ l 
D 
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Bttsod upo.n this Court's M:cmorruKhun Dcdsfon and Order Costs and Attorney Fees, 
entered on August 4, 2011, and good cause appearing: 
lT JS HERE.BY ORO.KREU, ADJUJ)HRD ANO rn~CREKD thatjudgrm~nt is entered 
io favor of defhndaut ENA and State defondnnfs and agahlst PlaintUJ as fol!ows: 
ENA C:'.<1~ts as a matter of right .in the am.ount of$11,42J.60; 
ENA Local Counsel Altomcys' fees awarded in tlw au:tount of $176,613.00; 
ENA Out of State Counsel Atton::ieys' fee,') awarded in die a.mount of $1 lJ,500; and 
S1ate Dofendants cost:i as a matter of right to the in the ;u11011nt of $9. 904.65; 
Qwest Costs as a matter. of dght in the uJ:t1mwt of$ J I ,787.21; 
Qwest Locttl Coumwl Attorneys> fe,es awu.rde.ti in the m::nount of $63,225. 77; 
Qwest Out of Staie Counsel Atto.rneys' fees awarded in Hie am.ount of .$303,210.50; 
Judg1nent i.n favor of defcn.dant Qwest: $J2Jb223,4fl. 
DATED this !"<i day of December, 2011 ... 
AMENJ)E:D JUOGMI:<:NT R~~: COSTS ANO ATTORN~Y ~'.RES~ 2 
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